Keeping decentralisation in check: An exploration of the relationship between municipal audit outcomes and levels of service delivery in South African local government by Craig, Stephanie Ella









Keeping Decentralisation in Check 
An Exploration of the Relationship between Municipal Audit Outcomes and 
Levels of Service Delivery in South African Local Government  
By  
Stephanie Ella Craig  
CRGSTE003  
 
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN  
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree  
 
Masters specialising in Economic Development 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Haroon Bhorat 
Faculty of Commerce  
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION 
I certify that this thesis presented for examination for the Masters in Commerce 
degree at the University of Cape Town is solely my own work; other than where 
ideas, information and data used by myself have been clearly referenced. I confirm 
that all data collation, statistical analysis, literature review and paper composition 
has been undertaken by myself. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization 
does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. 
 
The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this 
research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, 


















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 















ABSTRACT   
In a decentralised system of governance, checks and balances are important to prevent 
corruption and ensure the optimal performance of public service organisations. 
However, such regulations need to strike a careful balance between not being too 
simple and avoiding onerous, unnecessary complexity. Furthermore, the devolution 
of responsibility cannot occur in isolation – it must be accompanied by financial and 
operational support.  
 
Although South Africa has always had some form of a decentralised governing 
system, the Constitution of 1996 has formally entrenched this into the country’s 
current public administration. Local government, now a sphere within itself, is thus 
responsible for bringing the Bill of Human Rights to life, acting increasingly as the 
implementation arm for national government’s policies and initiatives.  
 
Following the passing of the Local Government Municipal Financial Management Act 
of 2003 (MFMA), South African municipalities are also required to comply with 
rigorous, annual auditing regulations. Intended to enforce sound financial governance 
and prevent abuse of devolved power, the influence of the audits is widely expected 
to positively impact other areas of municipal operations, ensuring well-run public 
organisations able to fulfil their service delivery mandate. Indeed, the general public 
uphold clean audit outcomes – a standard unique to South African municipal audits 
– as the only acceptable result and indication of effective local governance. However, 
this is not always the case.  
 
By examining the extent to which financial compliance, as represented by municipal 
audit outcomes, relates to local government service delivery performance, this thesis 
investigates whether the auditing regulations are appropriately designed to achieve 
their intended outcomes and asks how much of an impact sound financial 
management has upon municipal operations.  
 




The results suggest that, whilst there does appear to be a weak, positive relationship 
between clean audits and service delivery in some instances, on the whole the audit 
outcomes are not strongly related to municipal operational performance. The capacity 
of local governments to deliver services appears to be far more a function of their 
operational context - particularly the regional wealth levels, population density, 
political influence and available infrastructure - than financial compliance and audit 
outcomes.  
 
Given the costs of the current auditing system and difficulties faced by municipal 
employees in relation to the regulations, this thesis concludes with recommendations 
for its adaptation. These include amending its current one-size-fits-all design and 
moving away from a compliance focus towards performance, value-based auditing. 
In addition, local municipalities should be provided with greater amounts of 
operational support, as financial regulations alone – even when optimally designed – 
cannot be relied upon to keep the performance of South Africa’s decentralised system 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
The concept of a local municipality has been in existence since the Ancient Greek and 
Roman times. (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). In modern day South Africa, this is the level 
of government with which citizens come into contact most frequently. Responsible for 
basic services such as the provision of water, electricity, weekly refuse removal and 
sewage services – local municipalities play a major role in the daily life of South 
Africans and influence public opinion concerning the state of governance affairs in the 
country. The effective operation of local municipalities is thus crucial for South 
Africa’s economic development and democratic prosperity.  
 
This imperative was kept in mind by policy-makers during South Africa’s transition 
to democracy, and the rise in popularity of New Public Management (NPM) principles 
informed the formation of the country’s current three-tier, decentralised system of 
governance. Prior to the 1980s, public administration ‘relied on centralized control, set 
rules and guidelines, separated policymaking from implementation, and employed a 
hierarchical organizational structure,’ as was evident in the structure of South Africa’s  
Apartheid era government (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994).  In contrast, NPM focuses on 
enabling local government to effectively engage with competitive, market-based 
economies by infusing private sector efficiencies into a decentralised public sphere 
(Dunleavy & Hood, 1994).  Emerging from lessons learnt in the OECD countries, NPM 
aims to cut costs, improve public sector management practices, encourage 
entrepreneurial initiatives and emphasises performance management (Dunleavy & 
Hood, 1994).   
 
The adoption of NPM principles has led to comprehensive and extensive regulations 
regarding the auditing and performance of local government entities in South Africa. 
Chapter 12, Section 19-1941 of the South African constitution establishes the office, 
independence, powers and functions of the Auditor-General, whose task it is to ‘audit 
and report on all the accounts and financial statements of any local government, 
board, fund, institution, company, corporation or other organisation’ (Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996). A plethora of supporting legislation - including 




the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Local Government 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) 56 of 2003 - further entrench this ethos 
of performance management into local government entities. 
 
Consequently, South African municipalities are required to comply with a complex 
set of internal and external auditing requirements, intended to prevent corruption, 
optimise operational performance and instil good governance practices. They are , in 
fact, held to an even higher standard than international comparisons, as the concept 
of a ‘clean audit’ is more nuanced and difficult to achieve than the standard 
‘unqualified audit’ outcome. The concept of a ‘clean audit’ does not in fact exist in 
standard accounting terminology and is a governance construct unique to South 
Africa (Zille, 2015; Hugo, 2013).   The intention of the audits is to enforce strong, 
transparent financial governance, which will spill over into other areas of municipal 
operations and ensure well-run public organisations, able to fulfil their mandate and 
deliver services to the community. 
 
The results of such initiatives however, have been less than ideal. For the most part, 
audit outcomes across the provinces in South Africa have been woeful since they 
began with the introduction of the MFMA in 2003. For example, in the latest set of 
results, only 54 out of the 278 municipalities achieved clean audit outcomes, 109 were 
given unqualified audits with findings whilst 29 achieved disclaimers with findings 
(AGSA, 2015b). This despite the fact that a study conducted by the Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB) highlighted a significant amount of financial and human 
resources being allocated to administrative tasks (MDB, 2012). Meanwhile, numerous 
service delivery protests continue to occur across South Africa since 2004, reaching 
reached peak levels in 2009 (Allan & Heese, 2011).  
 
Thus, the question must be asked – is the current local government auditing system 
in South Africa achieving its performance management objectives and does it merit 
the amount of time and resources it requires? Does financial compliance have as 
strong a link to service delivery performance as the legislation envisions? Performance 




management and accountability regulations in a decentralised governance system 
must be carefully designed to ensure they achieve their objectives without restricting 
public entity operations or providing perverse incentives. Thus, it is important to ask 
such questions, not only in light of the central role played by local government with 
regards to public service delivery but because findings can improve the regulatory 






























Chapter Two: The Research Question and Study Outline 
2.1 Research Question 
The specific question this thesis will attempt to answer is as follows: 
 
To what extent does financial compliance, as represented by municipal audit outcomes, explain 
or influence the service delivery performance of a municipality?  
  
This thesis will assess this question for the audit years 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 as 
these coincide with census and community survey data collected during the same time 
periods by Statistics South Africa.  
 
2.2 Primary Objective 
The main objective of this thesis is to establish whether a relationship exists between 
the two relevant variables – municipal audit outcomes and service delivery 
performance - and if so, to assess the strength of such a relationship.  
 
If a positive relationship is found in the data, the thesis will then form the foundation 
for further research to identify constraints to service delivery that explain the 
challenges municipalities are facing in their daily operations.  
 
If a negative link is found, this thesis will elaborate on areas of the municipal audit 
system that could possibly be adapted in response to this relation. 
 
 If no link is found, then this thesis will provide justification for considering whether 
the time and resources spent on municipal audits are warranted. In such a case, more 
support for service delivery or a move towards performance-based auditing might be 
a better use of government resources. Striking the balance between providing 
sufficient oversight and corruption prevention mechanisms, whilst still allowing 
enough room for municipalities to function optimally and use their discretion in 
decision making, is key to achieving an effective performance management system in 
line with NPM ideals. 




2.3 Outline of the study 
This thesis will proceed as follows:  
 
Chapter three presents an overview of the South African municipal system, how it 
came to be in its present form and the rise of New Public Management concepts. 
Chapter four outlines service delivery by local governments in modern day South 
Africa, contrasting their legislated duties against their historical performance trends. 
Chapter five takes a closer look at the municipal financial system and its legislative 
design, as well as trends in municipal audit outcomes between 2007 and 2011.  
 
In chapter six, the factors needed for successful decentralisation are explained and the 
link between this and an effective municipal audit system explored. Chapter six also 
presents the findings from an online survey conducted with municipal managers and 
executive staff situated in various South African provinces, highlighting their varying 
opinions around the extent to which municipal audit outcomes reflect municipal 
service delivery.   
 
Chapter seven begins to outline the data work and empirical strategy of this thesis, 
clarifying its hypothesis and data sources. Chapter eight describes the balanced 
scorecard approach and its outcomes, whilst chapter nine proceeds with principal 
component analysis, grouping the municipalities into four quadrants based on their 
service delivery performance. These groupings are also used to graphically compare 
movements in service delivery levels to changes in audit outcomes, as difference-in-
difference empirical techniques are not suitable to the dataset.  
 
Chapter ten conducts Wilcoxon Rank Sum and Kruskal-Wallis H tests to highlight 
characteristics that differ across municipalities with varying levels of service delivery 
and audit performance. Chapter eleven continues the analysis with Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions followed by chapter twelve, which conducts fixed effects 
regressions to account for the missing variables not captured in the OLS regressions. 
Finally, chapter thirteen concludes with policy recommendations.  




Chapter Three: A brief history of South Africa’s local governance system  
 
3.1 From Centralisation to Decentralisation: The Rise of New Public Management.  
Prior to the 1970s, the world was enamoured with centralised systems of governance.  
This was influenced by the success that centralised nations enjoyed during the Second 
World War and their subsequent economic prosperity after embracing Keynesian 
economic principles, which were particularly suitable to centralised governments 
(Siddle & Koelble, 2013). There was major support for government intervention and 
subsidisation, and many foreign aid donors or foundations were in favour of working 
with one group of people over many individuals (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).   
 
Several factors arose though that challenged the idea of centralised governance 
systems. With growing populations and their increasing demands, central 
governments began to struggle with a lack of operational capacity and slow economic 
growth rates. Corruption levels rose, which served to reduce trust and support for 
central authorities (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).      
 
Thus, from the 1980s onwards, globally the field of public administration has 
increasingly been dealing with NPM and the concept of decentralisation. Although 
entirely separate concepts, NPM became very popular at the same time as 
decentralisation began to be widely adopted - thus they are often grouped together. 
NPM can be described as an ‘administrative doctrine or management approach,’ 
which attempts to infuse private sector efficiencies and technological improvements 
into local government, making the system run more effectively and in more a 
responsive, business-like and market-based manner (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). It is 
based on principles such as ‘efficiency, quality, flexibility, competition and 
management-by-contract (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
 
The United Nations defines decentralisation as ‘the process through which powers, 
functions, responsibilities and resources are transferred from central to local 
government and/or other decentralised entities’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Its 




popularity can be attributed to its applicability to a wide range of topics, including 
‘state reform, more effective service delivery and greater levels of democratisation 
through increased opportunities for citizen participation’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
Decentralisation is meant to promote democracy, public participation and efficiency 
whilst reducing corruption, improving communication between the public and 
private sector and preventing conflict (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
 
It is worthwhile noting that there are various types and degrees of decentralisation.  
Power and responsibilities can be decentralised with regard to administration, 
financial and political duties. These refer to the ability to govern over policy and 
service delivery decisions, revenues and expenses and election and political activities 
respectively (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Decentralisation and the transfer of power from 
one government entity to another can also occur to three different extents – 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Each 
respectively involves more transfer of power than the former: 
 
 Deconcentration: whilst the national government is still responsible for the design 
and legislating of policy, retaining its power and authority, deconcentration 
involves appointing provincial or local government entities to be responsible for 
the implementation and execution of said policies or programs. There is no change 
in terms of the powers of provincial or local government, they merely become 
implementing arms for national government initiatives. Deconcentration is thus 
mostly administration decentralisation (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
 Delegation: conducted via contractual agreements, delegation involves a greater 
transfer of responsibility to entities lower down in the government hierarchy. They 
are accountable to the central government organisation but have more autonomy 
over their actions and decisions (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
 Devolution: this is the greatest degree of decentralisation and involves 
government entities having autonomy over decision-making, implementation and 
execution responsibilities in ‘arms-length relationships’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
Devolution thus requires a significant amount of financial and operating resources 




to also be transferred from central government outwards, in order to allow such a 
decentralised system to operate effectively. This dependence is an important 
accountability mechanism between the different levels of government (Siddle & 
Koelble, 2013). 
 
The history of South African local government is essentially the story of its conversion 
from a centralised, racially-discriminate entity to a multi-sphered, inclusive 
organisation that has embraced NPM and devolution as a model for service delivery.  
It has been argued that the global movement away from centralised systems of 
governance heavily influenced South Africa’s adoption of a decentralised approach. 
Furthermore, the concept of decentralisation spoke to the ANC’s goal of increasing 
public participation to reunite the country and aligned with its Reconstruction and 
Development Plan (RDP), which relies a great deal on local municipalities. (Siddle & 
Koelble, 2013).  
 
3.2 From Apartheid to Freedom: The Birth of South Africa’s Democratic 
Municipalities 
South African local government, as we know it today, is a result of much political 
deliberation and numerous pieces of legislation intended to carefully guide its 
transformation and arrangement from the end of the Apartheid era through to its 
current form. Although South African local governments have been in fluctuation ever 
since the Dutch settlers first established municipalities in the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652, the theme of decentralisation has run as a common thread throughout all 
transition periods (Venter et al., 2007).  
In 1836, British colonialists founded their own version of municipal governance in the 
Cape, passing the South African Act in 1910 (Venter et al., 2007). The act introduced 
the Westminster system to the country, where the parliament was the highest 
governing organ and could exert its power over any local entity that provincial 
councils established, such as town councils and boards (Craythorne, 2006). During this 
time, there were ‘two forms of governance, with a democratic and relatively 




decentralised system for white South Africans and a much more centralised system 
for black South Africans’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).   
In 1961 the country brought in a new constitution – the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 32. This removed its status as a constitutional monarchy and made it 
a republic, whilst also establishing the hierarchy of provincial governments over local 
entities (Craythorne, 2006). Consequently, local government had little influence over 
their own operations, receiving their powers and responsibilities through ordinances 
drawn up by provincial governing bodies (Hadenius, 2003).  
Furthermore, Apartheid policies lead to the formation of racially demarcated 
homelands and ‘Bantustans,’ which were treated as separate entities from the then 
whites-only republic of South Africa (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Each racial group had 
its own form of governance, with only the white municipalities having access to 
adequate funds and truly democratically representing the views of its constituencies 
(Hadenius, 2003).  
 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 further complicated matters 
through its introduction of ‘a system of own and general affairs’ (Craythorne, 2006). 
Own affairs were racially specific issues that only applied to or affected certain 
population groups, whilst all other matters were classed as general issues 
(Craythorne, 2006). The constitution removed black representation entirely from 
parliament.      
 
3.3 From 1994 to 2016: What Local Government Looks Like Today   
This all changed drastically when the early 1990s brought about South Africa’s 
transition to democracy, setting the country on a lengthy path of development and 
reformation that has brought it to its current state. Although the ANC and anti -
apartheid activists were in favour of a more centralised government to ensure 
maximum transformation and prevent any vestiges of apartheid remaining in remote 
parts of the system, they were ultimately convinced that a decentralised approach 
would be best (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). The formation and design of South African 




local government evolved has continuously from 1994 as the country moves through 
various transition and growth stages. Ultimately, a series of constitutional and 
legislative reforms has ‘assured the existence of local government as a sphere of 
government in its own right, with full constitutional protection’ (Siddle & Koelble, 
2013). 
 
South Africa’s final constitution (1996) entrenched this by building on the foundation 
laid by the Interim Constitution, which was in power from the first municipal elections 
in 1995/1996 until the local government elections in 2000. Notably, the Interim 
Constitution was the first in South Africa’s history to abolish the Westminster system 
of governance, where parliament was the absolute sovereign ruling body in the land 
(Craythorne, 2006). It unified the country into ‘one sovereign state’ wherein the 
constitution is ‘the supreme law of the Republic and any law inconsistent with its 
provisions shall be of no force and effect’ (Craythorne, 2006). 
 
The final constitution (1996) carries these changes over into its regime and provides 
for ‘a three-sphere system of government in which the spheres are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated,’ with intergovernmental relations being based on 
‘the principle of cooperative governance’ (Hadenius, 2003). Local government is thus 
not meant to be subservient to provincial or national government but rather operate 
on an equal level, despite its continued reliance on national government for financial 
grants and equitable shares of revenue. In contrast to the apartheid regime, provincial 
government may now only involve itself in the local government sphere should the 
municipalities ‘fail to fulfil an executive obligation’ (Hadenius, 2003).  
 
These change are in line with a decentralised system which, as previously mentioned, 
South Africa has always actually had in one form or another.  By making local 
government a sphere within itself, although interrelated with provincial and national 
government structures, the final constitution has really cemented this trend into South 
African politics and public administration. There has not just been a ‘redistribution of 




authority, resources and accountability’ but it has been prescribed by the highest law 
of the land (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).  
 
However, a decentralised system that has not been properly adapted to the context in 
which it will operate and that lacks sufficient resources and support mechanisms will 
not be successful. Unfortunately, as will later be discussed, it could be said that South 
Africa’s system of governance has fallen victim to such a fate and is in need of some 
form of intervention. This is highlighted in the analysis of historical service delivery 



























Chapter Four: Local Government Service Delivery in Modern Day South Africa  
Section 152 in chapter 7 of the final constitution (1996), entitled ‘Objects of local 
government,’ lays out the duties of municipalities in South Africa. These include:  
 “providing democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
 ensuring the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
 promoting social and economic development; 
 promoting a safe and healthy environment; and 
 encouraging the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.” (The Constitution, 1996) 
With regards to local municipalities’ duty to serve to their communities, the Fourth 
Schedule of the Constitution (1996) sets out their general responsibilities regarding 
essential services including the provision of the following: 
 Electricity 
 Sewage & Sanitation facilities 
 Parks and recreational areas  
 Abattoirs and Fresh Food Markets 
 Economic Development & Local Tourism  
 Refuse removal & Nature Conservation 
 Clean drinking water 
 Storm water systems 
 Firefighting services  
 Basic shelter, public transport and roads  
 Municipal health services (Gov.za , 2014).   
4.1 The White Paper on Local Government 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government further outlines the responsibilities of 
South African municipalities, constructively shaping their purpose and structure to 
provide a contextual framework for their operations (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). It also 
cemented NPM principles into South Africa’s system of governance, emphasising 




aspects such as performance management, decentralisation of operational 
management responsibility and public-private partnerships (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
What the paper fails to do though, as will later be discussed, is stipulate how such 
development tools should be introduced and applied in practice.  
One of the main themes emerging from the White Paper was that of a developmental 
local government, one that is ‘committed to working with citizens and groups within 
the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and materials 
needs and improve the quality of their lives’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). The new system 
envisages local government as a change agent in South African society, promoting 
economic development, fostering democracy, redistributing resources to those in need 
and working to build world-class, integrated and sustainable living environments 
(Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Increasingly being used as the implementation and 
executional arm for national government’s policies and initiatives , local governments 
are now responsible for bringing the Bill of Human Rights to life and delivering on its 
promises to South African citizens (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).   
The White Paper was also concerned with overhauling the existing administrative 
systems of municipalities in order to streamline their operations and facilitate 
innovative methods of service delivery (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). In support, the Local 
Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 was legislated. This act not only 
formalises the formation of the actual municipal entities, but it divides them into 
different categories, assigns each category its powers and responsibilities and outlines 
the voting process or electoral system to be used at the local government level (Siddle 
& Koelble, 2013). 
 
The three categories are metropolitan, district and local municipalities. Whilst 
metropolitan municipalities are situated in large, urban areas, local municipalities are 
clustered in groups that fall under the jurisdiction of district municipalities. These are 
usually situated in smaller towns and rural areas (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). 
Metropolitan municipalities have ‘exclusive municipal executive and legislative 
authority’ over their jurisdictions whilst local and district municipalities normally 




share this authority (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). As of 2016, there are 8 metropolitan, 44 
district and 226 local municipalities in South Africa.  
 
In addition, the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework further breaks down 
local and district municipalities into five more categories:  
 
 B1: local municipalities with the largest budgets, which are also known as 
‘secondary cities’ 
 B2: local municipalities with large towns at their core 
 B3: Local municipalities with small towns and relatively small populations  
 B4: local municipalities that are mainly rural with communal land tenure 
 C1: district municipalities that are not water service authorities 
 C2: district municipalities that are water service authorities (Siddle & Koelble, 
2013). 
 
4.2 Service Delivery and Historical Municipal Audit Trends  
To assess the effectiveness of these pieces of legislation and municipal performance in 
relation to them, this thesis now presents an examination of essential service delivery 
indicators across different contexts. These indicators are represented in figure one, 
which demonstrates that apart from improvements in access to electricity for lighting 
and cooking, across South Africa there was very little movement either way for the 

























Source: Statistics South Africa, 2011 & 2007 
 
These averages can be further broken down into specific categories that provide a 
more useful lens for analysis. For example, figure two demonstrates levels of service 
delivery across the nine South African provinces. It is clear that the variation in access 
to piped water in dwellings, flushing sewage systems and weekly refuse removal 
fluctuates far more across provinces than the relatively similar levels of access to brick 
dwellings and electricity. Residents of the Western Cape, Gauteng, Free State and 
Northern Cape have higher levels of access to service delivery than the residents in 
other provinces.  In addition, there does not appear to be a major increase in access to 
services in any of the provinces – between 2007 and 2011 there is a slight general 
upwards trend, however it is not remarkable.  
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Figure 2: Access to Municipal Services across Provinces (%) 
Source: Statistics South Africa Census 2011 & Community Survey 2007 




Figure Three conducts the same analysis across the three different types of 
municipalities – metropolitan, district and local municipalities. It appears that, for 
each of the seven service delivery indicators (excecpt for brick housing), metropolitan 
municipalities deliver a higher percentage of services than local or district 
municipalities. This is likely a reflection of their larger resource base, having more 
financial and staff capacity than smaller municipalities. However, the gap is bigger 
with respect to weekly refuse removal, flushing sewage systems and piped water to 
dwellings than it is across brick dwellings and electricity provision. Whilst district and 
local municipalities increased their levels of service delivery across most of the 
indicators, it is interesting to note that metropolitan municipalities demonstrate a 
decline in provision of access to flushing sewage systems and piped water levels 
between 2007 and 2011. This contrasts strongly against their large increase in the 














Source: Statistics South Africa Census 2011 & Community Survey 2007 
 
Generalising these categories further, the same analysis can be run on different 
categories derived from the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework 
described earlier. The results in figure four compare a B1 local municipality to a B4 
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Figure 3: Services available across different types of Municipalities (%) 




local municipality, where B1 municipalities are classified as ‘municipalities with the 
largest budgets, known as secondary cities’ and B4 municipalities are ‘local 



















Source: Statistics South Africa Census 2011 & Community Survey 2007 
 
The contrast in overall access to service levels between the B1 and B4 municipalities is 
starkly represented in figure four. For example, while 69% of people in B1 
municipalities had access to flushing toilets in 2011, only 7.5% of people has similar 
access in B4 municipalities. Thus, despite overall increases in the amount of services 
being delivered, particularly in the areas of electricity and housing, very large levels 
of inequality remain between different types of municipalities. This is indicative of the 
varying contexts and resources in which and with which municipalities operate.  
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In summary, between 2007 and 2011, there has only been a slight improvement in 
access to essential services. It is clear that municipalities in South Africa have to deliver 
public services in vastly varying contexts and across the three types of organisations, 
metropolitan municipalities provide much higher levels of services to its residents 
than district and local municipalities. This is particularly true in terms of weekly 
refuse removal, piped water and flushed sewage systems, whilst access to brick 
dwellings and electricity is far more equitable across the three municipal levels. 
Should it be the case that financial compliance influences municipal operations, one 
would expect to see similar trends occurring in the municipal audit outcomes. 
Furthermore, the design of an effective auditing system would have to take account 

























Chapter Five: South African Local Government Finance  
In terms of the local government finance system, the White Paper on Local 
Government (1998) sought to align it with the following principles: 
 
 “Revenue adequacy and certainty  
 Sustainable and effective use of resources  
 Accountability, transparency and good governance 
 Equity and redistribution 
 Macroeconomic management and development investment”  
 
To aid it in achieving these development objectives, the White Paper (1998) 
subsequently highlighted four specific areas of municipal finance that required 
reorganisation:  
 
 Local revenue instruments and policies 
 National-local intergovernmental transfers 
 Gearing in private investments 
 Budgeting, accounting and financial reporting systems  
 
This thesis is mostly concerned with this last point - that of budgeting, accounting and 
financial reporting systems. In a decentralised system of governance such as South 
Africa’s, it is important to have strong financial regulations and performance 
management systems to ensure stability, transparency and reliability. Corruption 
prevention is an additional imperative in need of checks and balances. Thus, even 
from as early as 1803, South Africa has had a ‘rudimentary form of audits’ in place 
(Craythorne, 2006), introduced to the Cape by the Dutch but retained in later 
legislation relating to the country’s British Colonies. The Cape Municipal Ordinance 
of 1836 and the Ordinance 1 of 1840 set the now widespread precedent of government 
activities being audited on a regular basis in South Africa (Craythorne, 2006). 
 




However, the White Paper identified financial reporting and monitoring systems as 
being an area in need of address due to the prevalence in South Africa of ‘unrealistic 
budgeting, poor credit control, a lack of budgetary and financial discipline, and a lack 
of user-friendly and accessible information on the budget process’ (Siddle & Koelble, 
2013). Consequently, the White Paper recommended Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices be adopted by South African local government together with numerous 
pieces of legislation design to provide additional financial frameworks and guidance. 
These included the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997, the Financial 
and Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997, the Local Government Municipal Property 
Rates Act 6 of 2004, the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act 12 of 2007 and 
most importantly for this thesis, the Local Government Municipal Financial 
Management Act (MFMA) 56 of 2003.     
 
5.1 Financial Management and the Audit System in Local Government 
As set out in the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the MFMA, 
the financial management of municipalities and local government is entrusted to an 
accounting officer and chief financial officer. These officials are supported by the 
municipal mayor and their respective managers (Craythorne, 2006).   
 
In particular, the MFMA establishes a rigorous annual auditing process with which 
all municipalities must comply. Firstly, every municipality or municipal entity has to 
set up an internal audit team, whose responsibility it is to institute internal checks and 
balances that make certain no fraud or misconduct occurs during daily operations 
(Craythorne, 2006). The team is tasked with the job of formulating strategies 
pertaining to issues such as risk, performance and loss management (Craythorne, 
2006). The MFMA also makes provision for an audit committee in each municipality 
or municipal entity. Acting as a source of advice, this committee is comprised of three 
or more people, who are mostly external to the organisation and provide support and 
guidance on financial or administrative issues submitted to it by municipal staff 
(Craythorne, 2006).   
 




The roles of each of these various stakeholders are all interfaced with the Auditor 
General (AG) due to section 188, chapter nine of South Africa’s constitution. This 
clause mandates the establishment of an independent, unbiased and nonpartisan AG 
which is meant to ‘act without fear, favour or prejudice.’ It is sub ject only to the 
constitution and accountable solely to the National Treasury (AGSA, 2015; 
Craythorne, 2006).   
 
The duties of the AG are further legislated in the Public Audit Act No 35 of 2004. It is 
the AG’s task to ‘produce audit reports on all government departments, public 
entities, municipalities and public/constitutional institutions or accounting entity’ 
(AGSA, 2015). It must also fulfil the requirements of both the Public Finance 
Management Act and the MFMA, ‘auditing and reporting on the accounts , financial 
statements and financial management’ of all the entities listed therein (Craythorne, 
2006).  
 
Consequently, in order to facilitate the auditing process, by the 31st August every year 
local municipalities across South Africa are required to produce annual financial 
statements for the AG to examine. The outcome of the AG’s assessment is then 
recorded in each municipality’s annual operational report, which is to be made 
publically available each year. The municipal financial reports, compiled by the 
municipalities accounting officer and financial team, must consequently include: 
 
 Information on the financial position, performance and liquidity of the entity 
 How it performed against its budgeted and expected objectives  
 How it managed its revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities 
 The various business activities it undertook 
 The receipt and expenditure of any intergovernmental transfers and allocations 
(Craythorne, 2006).    
 
These reports must also be ‘free from material misstatements,’ meaning that ‘incorrect 
or omitted information’ is not permitted (AGSA, 2012). Once submitted, the AG will 




then assess them to determine the state of financial affairs at each municipality and 
express an ‘opinion’ reflecting whether they feel that the public expend iture has been 
adequate and appropriate. There are three main sections that the AG investigates and 
on which they base their opinion:  
 
 Whether the financial statements have been accurately and truthfully presented, 
with no major mistakes, and whether the information contained therein is useful 
and reliable for users (AGSA, 2015).  
 Whether the entity’s performance with regards to predetermined service delivery 
objectives has been accurately and truthfully presented. Predetermined objectives 
are the performance targets that municipalities set on an annual basis and which 
are meant to be used as instruments supporting service delivery. The AG will 
assess the extent to which the municipal entity has achieved its stated goals by 
comparing the information in the financial statements to the predetermined 
objectives. This has been a part of the auditing process since 2005, however it was 
only in 2009 that the AG included a separate outcome based solely on 
predetermined objectives (AGSA, 2015).    
 Whether the entity has complied with financial rules and regulations (AGSA, 
2015a). This section of the audit checks how well municipal entities have abided 
by the financial duties and obligations placed upon them by the many pieces of 
legislation referred to earlier, such as the MFMA and the Municipal Structures and 
Systems Acts. This is also where municipal entities ‘disclose any unauthorised, 
irregular as well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure incurred’ (AGSA, 2015).         
 
More specific examples of factors examined by the auditor general include the quality 
of submitted financial statements, the quality of annual performance reports, supply 
chain and human resource management, information technology controls and 
financial health (AGSA, 2012a). Although the core sections have remained the same, 
it should be noted that the sophistication and thoroughness of the audit reports has 
been improving over the years. Between 2007 and 2011, the audit reports have become 




more comprehensive in terms of factors examined and appear to be focusing more on 
service delivery performance than solely on financial compliance.  
 
There are five possible audit opinions that the AG can give:  
 
 A clean audit – the municipality achieved positive outcomes on all three of the 
criteria listed above. Not only are the financial statements free of mistakes, but the 
entity has also complied with all rules and regulations whilst accurately 
representing its performance with regards to predetermined objectives. A clean 
audit is also recorded as an ‘unqualified with no findings’ outcome (AGSA, 2015).   
 Financially unqualified audit with findings – whilst the statements are accurately 
represented with no major mistakes, the AG has found a few concerns regarding 
predetermined objectives or compliance which result in findings being raised 
(AGSA, 2015).   
 Qualified audit with findings – the financial statements have quantifiable and 
clearly identifiable mistakes which jeopardise its validity and reliability (AGSA, 
2015).   
 Adverse audit with findings - the financial statements are marred by significant 
mistakes and misstatements that are not quantifiable (AGSA, 2015).   
 Disclaimer audit – this is the worst possible outcome. The financial statements lack 
sufficient information, to a significant degree, for the AG to form an opinion on its 
contents (AGSA, 2015).   
 
5.2 Performance of South Africa’s municipal audit system 
South Africa is the only country in the world to adopt the idea of a ‘clean audit’  
outcome (Zille, 2015). In international accounting standards, there are only three audit 
outcome categories – unqualified, qualified and disclaimer – and financial statements 
free of major misstatements would normally earn them the status of a ‘financially 
unqualified’ audit (AGSA, 2015).  
 



















































Clean (UQNF) UQF Qualified Adverse Disclaimer
Figure 5: National Audit Outcomes for 2007 and 2011 (% of Municipalities) 
South Africa, however, has introduced an extra auditing standard, requiring 
municipalities to also meet compliance requirements and predetermined objectives 
before they can achieve a ‘clean’ audit. These extra regulations have significantly 
contributed to the generally poor national audit results – 299 of the 338 municipalities 
audited in 2012/2013 were not awarded clean audit outcomes due to findings around 
their predetermined objectives (Hugo, 2013).  
 
Figure five shows that there have been improvements in audit outcomes across the 
board, including a 7.9% decrease in the percentage of Disclaimer audits and a 6.39% 
increase in Unqualified audits. However, despite an increase of 2.13%, the number of 
municipalities achieving a clean audit is still very low and a significant amount receive 














As with the service delivery graphs displayed in figure five, the national audit 
outcomes can be examined at a provincial level and further broken down into type 
and tier of municipality. Figure six demonstrates the results achieved in different parts 
of the country, revealing that the Western Cape was awarded the most clean audits, 
followed by Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal with significant numbers of financially 




unqualified outcomes. On the other hand, the Eastern Cape, Free State and Limpopo 

















Source: Auditor General South Africa MFMA Reports 
 
With regards to the different levels of municipalities shown in figure seven, better 
audit outcomes are achieved in metropolitan municipalities as opposed to local 
municipalities. Between 2007 and 2011, there was a decrease in Disclaimers of 
approximately 7% and there were none achieved by metropolitan municipalities in 
2011. Across the board, there was an increase in Qualified and Unqualified audit 
outcomes, with small growth in clean audits in district and local municipalities. On 
the other hand, there was a large decrease in clean audits in metropolitan 




Figure 6: Municipal Audit Outcomes across Provinces in 2011 

















Source: Auditor General South Africa MFMA Reports 
 
Looking one level lower, at the difference in audit outcome between B1 and B4 
outcomes, it becomes clear that both categories of municipalities experienced an 
increase in its number of unqualified audits and a decrease in its number of 
disclaimers. This is shown in figure eight. There was also a ubiquitous drop in adverse 
audit outcomes. Ultimately, there does not appear to be a noteworthy difference in the 






















































































































































Source: Auditor General South Africa MFMA Reports 
 
Interestingly, similar issues were highlighted in both the South African Auditor-
General’s 2007 and 2011 MFMA audit reports as being causes behind the poor audit 
outcomes. A significant factor at play is the capacity levels of local governments to 
meet audit requirements, which is linked to a lack of skilled staff and high vacancy 
rates. Senior positions such as Chief Financial Officers are often not filled in South 
African municipalities. As a result, in 2011 73% of the municipalities that were audited 
had to hire external consultants to assist with the audit process. Their high fee bills 
constrained limited municipal finances even further – in 2014/2015 this amounted to 
a figure of R892-million (Dlamini & Henderson, 2016). The issue of governance and 
poor leadership was also flagged, with politics and slow response times posing 
numerous challenges in the day-to-day operation of municipalities. Furthermore, 
there are few consequences for poor staff performance, which does not incentivise 
staff to perform well.  
 




Chapter Six: The theory behind successful decentralisation and the role of 
municipal audits 
 
6.1 What is needed for successful decentralisation?  
The weaknesses in municipalities hinder the effective operation of South Africa’s 
decentralised governance system. They also indicate that the system has been poorly 
adapted to and implemented in the South African municipal environment. According 
to Olowu and Wunsch (2004) simply passing legislation or imitating the political 
processes of another country is not sufficient to ensure a decentralised system of local 
government that operates effectively.  
 
Manor (1999) contests that, for decentralisation of power to be successful, regulations 
need to strike a careful balance between not being too simple and avoiding onerous, 
unnecessary complexity. Furthermore, decentralisation of power cannot occur in 
isolation – financial decentralisation must simultaneously occur and entities to which 
responsibility is devolved must be adequately equipped to perform their duties. To 
this end, Manor (1999) is concerned that developing countries such as South Africa 
might struggle to adopt global ‘best practice’ governance systems as they lack the 
necessary ‘skills and resources needed to implement and maintain complex 
arrangements.’  
 
Unfortunately, his concerns might be justified, with local government recently being 
described as being in a state of ‘paralysis and dysfunction’ by the Minister of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). Inheriting 
a racially divided country besieged by financial inequality and overwhelming 
poverty, the odds were stacked against local municipalities in South Africa from the 
very start of the country’s democracy. Despite being delegated a very long and 
complex list of responsibilities from National and Provincial government, local 
municipalities have not always been provided with the necessary operational and 
financial support. Siddle and Koelble (2013) outline some of these missing factors as 
being:  





 Limited funding and social capital 
 Lack of strong leadership 
 Lack of skilled human resources  
 Feeble institutional design  
 
These last two points are, in their opinion, the most concerning factors. They see these 
as ‘serious impediments to addressing the issues of economic development and 
service delivery,’ whilst ‘the failure of local government is to be found in the demands 
placed by a complex system on institutions that have limited ability and little 
inclination to meet those demands’ (Siddle & Koelble, 2013).  
 
Thus, the argument is not that the concept of decentralisation itself is flawed or should 
not have occurred. Rather, trying to implement a decentralised system and its 
associated checks and balances without providing the necessary supporting resources 
and contextualising it to these operational important factors is not likely to result in 
success (Siddle & Koelble, 2013). South Africa’s municipal auditing regulations – 
meant to capture a snapshot of the state of local government performance and 
financial management – is a prime part of the MFMA against which to test this 
argument.  
 
6.2 How do municipal audit outcomes relate to decentralisation?  
In a decentralised system of governance, without sufficient revenue and good 
financial controls, municipalities will not have the means to provide services and fulfil 
their duties. As Venter et al (2007) contend, ‘management of municipal funds 
(including their control and safeguarding) is the fulcrum around which municipal 
service delivery revolves.’ The municipal audit system is thus intended to ensure that 
local governments manage their finances properly and perform adequately in terms 
of their predetermined service delivery objectives.    
Consequently, there must then be a link between the municipal audit outcomes and a 
municipality’s service delivery performance. If this is not the case, then municipal 




audits are potentially an indication that the checks and balances of decentralised 
system of local governance has been poorly implemented in South Africa. 
Alternatively, the generally poor audit outcomes might suggest that local 
municipalities need more operational support to carry out their legislated duties, as 
the devolution of responsibilities has not been matched with equal distribution of 
capacity and financial support. The next section of this chapter explores these possible 
relations and their consequences further.  
 
6.3 A closer look at the link between municipal audits and service delivery  
Clean audits are promoted as an imperative for municipal managers to achieve, with 
a significant amount of municipal financial and human resources dedicated towards 
them. They are expected to be correlated with strong levels of service delivery, as they 
indicate a municipality has capable management and thus the ability to meet its 
performance obligations. In the words of Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016), ‘a direct 
correlation suggests that a municipality’s internal structure and financial reporting 
permeate into its outer spheres of performance and service delivery.’  
 
Assuming that this is the case, the emphasis COGTA and the AG places upon 
achieving clean audits would then be valid, as better financial governance should 
assist municipalities to improve their operations. South Africa’s dismal audit 
outcomes could thus be representative of poor financial administration impeding 
service delivery across the country. They may also perhaps hint that municipalities 
have not been sufficiently capacitated to handle the amount of responsibility devolved 
to them within a decentralised system. Attracting and retaining qualified staff has 
often been a challenge for local government, with ‘1 in 3 budgeted posts nationally 
vacant’ (MDB, 2012). This is a particular struggle for rural municipalities, as B4 
municipalities (Local municipalities which are mainly rural with communal tenure 
and with, at most, one or two small towns in their area) have up to 50% of their funded 
posts vacant (MDB,2012). There is also a significant skills divide between managerial 
level staff and technical service managers in local municipalities, of whom less than 




50% do not have tertiary education despite being directly responsible for service 
delivery functions (MDB, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, there may be low or no correlation between the audits and service 
delivery because, as the AG’s website states, ‘the audit does not provide assurance 
that service delivery has been achieved, only that the annual performance report is 
useful and reliable’ (AGSA, 2015). Barry Wheeler, an executive employee of the AG, 
further explains that ‘to achieve a clean audit means one has got the financial 
statements correct, with no fault in the basics of accounting’ but this ‘does not mean 
there are no internal control weaknesses’ (Masombuka, 2015). Thus, as long as a 
municipality’s financial records are all in order, complying with the regulations and 
accurately reflecting the state of affairs in its constituency, it can achieve a clean 
outcome even if the state of affairs is poor and service delivery is unsatisfactory. 
 
This also speaks to the cases where audit outcomes appear to be negatively correlated 
with service delivery levels. An example is the Msinga municipality, where positive 
audit outcomes have been achieved despite service delivery protests frequently 
occurring amongst their constituents (Lund, 2014). It is possible that the municipal 
audit system actually results in perverse incentives, limiting service delivery. For 
example, if a municipality sets a pre-determined objective to build 12km of roads 
during a certain calendar year, failure to realise that goal will result in a finding made 
by the auditor-general, regardless of whether 1km or 11.9kms of roads were built. 
Thus, Zille (2015) points out that the potential for auditors to make findings around 
pre-determined objectives leads to municipal departments avoiding “stretch targets” 
and setting “the bar a little lower” than normal.  As one municipal manager bluntly 
stated, ‘the easiest way for a municipality to obtain a clean audit is for it to do as little 
as possible, in which case there will be no findings for the AG to make’ (McCartney, 
2015).  
 
Nonetheless, even if municipal audits are more indicators of how well a municipality 
complies with Generally Recognised Accounting Practices (GRAP) rather than how 




well it is operating as a service-orientated, public entity (Lund, 2014), the costs and 
design of the audit system can still be questioned. The emphasis on compliance often 
leads to many situations in which municipalities are caught between a regulation and 
reality, unable to take rational action due to restrictive red tape (Zille, 2015). Often 
these difficulties revolve around contracting and procurement regulations. For 
example, local municipalities are required to fill senior management vacancies with 
90 days of the positions becoming available. (Zille, 2015). However, the stipulated 
vetting processes are very seldom completed within 90 days – leaving local 
municipalities with the choice of either complying with all the hiring processes 
regardless of how long it takes, or hiring a candidate within the allocated 90 days but 
neglecting some of the vetting procedures.  
 
Additionally, if no link to service delivery exists, can the amount of resources spent 
and emphasis placed on the audits be justified? This question is especially pertinent 
in light of the roughly 120 time-consuming regulations with which municipalities 
must comply and the huge expense that the annual audits present to municipalities 
(Hugo, 2013). For the Western Cape government alone, this amounts to approximately 
R100-million in annual fees. Furthermore, the Capacity Assessment conducted by the 
MDB (2012) found that C1, B4 and C2 municipalities spend 48.4%, 70% and 41% of 
their budgets respectively on governance and administration tasks, which would 
include municipal audit activities. Over and above the fact that this represents a 
significant amount of duplication between local and district municipalities (MDB, 
2012), these figures substantiate the argument that the municipal audit system is 
unnecessarily onerous with limited impact upon service delivery performance.  
Aadnesgaard and Willow (2016) agree, stating that such disconnect to service delivery 
would ‘put forward the issue that perhaps evaluating municipalities on audit 
outcomes and holding municipalities accountable on these results is not effective in 








6.3.1 A Cursory Glance at the Data 
In an attempt to uncover which of the above scenarios actually characterise the 
relationship between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery performance, 
this thesis now moves to examine the available data empirically. It begins with a 
simplistic, non-parametric comparison of outcomes across a traditionally well-
performing local municipality, Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape, and a usually 
under-performing local municipality, Ntabankulu in the Eastern Cape. 
Geographically, this contrast in performance holds true as most of the weakest 
municipalities are located in the Eastern Cape or Kwa-Zulu Natal whilst the strongest 
ones are in the Western Cape (BusinessTech.co.za, 2014; BusinessTech.co.za, 2016). 






































































Saldanha 2011 Saldanha 2007 Ntabankulu 2011 Ntabankulu 2007




Table 1:  Differences in audit outcomes between the Saldanha and Ntabankulu Municipalities 
 
 
Source: Auditor General South Africa MFMA Reports 
 
As is evident from figure nine and table one, there were larger improvements in 
service delivery in the Ntabankulu municipality than there were in Saldanha. In fact, 
there were declines in numerous categories in the Western Cape municipality. 
However, it is obvious that on the whole, there are far higher levels of service delivery 
levels in Saldanha than in Ntabankulu municipality, whose growth comes off a much 
lower base. In terms of audit outcomes, both municipalities improved from their 2007 
Disclaimer results, although from this there doesn’t seem to be a clear link between 
the movement in this and in service delivery.  
 
Likewise, previous figures showed that on the whole, there is relatively acceptable 
levels of service delivery in South Africa but very few positive municipal audit 
outcomes (AGSA, 2012a). Whilst the Northern Cape was amongst the best performing 
provinces in terms of service delivery, it had many outstanding or disclaimer audits. 
Alternatively, KwaZulu-Natal has some of the lowest levels of service delivery and 
yet also achieved many strong audit results. The Free State was the only province to 
improve both in terms of service delivery and audit performance, but not one of its 
municipalities achieved a clean audit (AGSA, 2012a). Thus, the variability in service 
delivery levels is not matched by the variability in possible audit outcomes, of which 
there are only five – making it difficult to see whether there is any relation between 
the two just by examining output graphs.  
 
6.4 A survey of municipal employees’ opinions  
In order to gain some sense of municipal employees’ perceptions of and working 
experience with the local government audit system, an online survey was conducted. 
Audit Outcomes 2007 2011 
Saldanha Municipality Disclaimer Unqualified with Findings 
Ntabankulu municipality Disclaimer Qualified with findings 




Although having been sent out to all 278 municipalities in South Africa, the poor 
quality database of municipal contact details and often apathetic attitude of municipal 
employees towards research questionnaires saw the survey achieve a very low 
response rate (5%). 18 staff members, mostly municipal managers or financial officers, 
responded from 14 different municipalities. The respondents came from six different 
provinces: KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng 
and Mpumalanga. One respondent chose to remain anonymous. Furthermore, 15 out 
of the 18 respondents stated that they have direct involvement with the municipal 
audit system.  
 
Despite the poor response rate, the insights provided by those who did respond are 
still useful for this paper, in that they shed light on the human element of municipal 
audits from those directly involved with local government daily activities. However, 
they are limited in their representivity of municipal employees’ views and thus should 
not be taken as robust trends. The survey participants were asked to answer two 
questions where they had to rank the effectiveness of the municipal audit system on 
a scale of one to ten, with ten representing complete accuracy. The two questions were 
as follows:  
 
 How effective are municipal audits at capturing financial compliance?  
 To what extent does financial compliance reflect service delivery 
performance? (I.e. does strong financial compliance equate to good service 
delivery performance?)  
 
Figure ten represents the individual results of the survey, with each respondent’s 
answer to the two questions contrasted against one another. As shown, the orange line 
(short dashes) represents the ratings given in terms of the municipal audits’ 
representation of financial compliance. Aside from two outliers, the audits 
consistently scored 7 out of 10 or more. This indicates that most of the respondents 
perceive the audits to strongly represent the financial compliance of a municipality.  
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On the other hand, there is far more variability in the blue line (longer dashes). This 
line represents the extent to which financial compliance, and by extension, local 
government audits, are a reflection of the level of service delivery being achieved by 
a municipality.  Whilst some perceive there to be a strong link between the two 
variables, others are of the opinion that the link is very weak – with the lowest rating 
being 2 out of 10. It is thus clear that there does not seem to be shared agreement 
around the strength of the representativeness of municipal audits with regards to 














The responses have also been grouped to create a clearer picture of general trends. 
Figures eleven and twelve show that whilst on average, the employees rated 
municipal audits approximately 8 out of 10 for their representation of municipal 
financial compliance, there was a much greater spread of rankings in terms of their 
link to service delivery levels. For example, in figure eleven, seven respondents gave 
municipal audits and their ability to represent financial compliance a score of 8/10. 
However, in figure twelve, which demonstrates scores given to municipal audits for 
their strength as proxies of service delivery performance, four respondents indicated 
they perceived there to be a strong link between the two (9/10) and seven respondents 
felt there was a weak link, ranking the relation between a 3/10 to 5/10.  




Figure 11: Number of Votes for Financial Compliance Representation 
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Respondents were further asked to clarify whether they thought the two indicators 
moved in the same direction. That is, whether changes in audit outcomes over a period 
of time are correlated to changes in service delivery performance.  Again, the results  
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Figure 13: If your audit outcomes improve over a period of time, is there normally a correlated 












However, a clear majority did emerge with 8 out of the 18 respondents indicating that 
although the two seemed to move with one another, they did not think there was 
necessarily a significant link between them. Four respondents agreed, stating that the 
two would move in the same direction but only slightly as opposed to a one-for-one 
change. Whilst four people thought that the two variables were strongly correlated, 
two people were of the opinion that there was no relation between audit outcomes 
and service delivery at all.  
 
These responses indicate that there seems to be general agreement that municipal 
audits strongly capture the financial compliance and management capacity of a 
municipality. On the other hand, there is no clear agreement amongst respondents as 
to how this links with service delivery.  
 
To explore the idea that municipal audits may be impeding service delivery and to get 
a sense of how municipal employees view the system, respondents were asked the 
following two questions:  
 
 Do you think that the current audit system impinges upon service delivery? If 
so, why? 




 Is getting a clean audit worth the effort it takes? (I.e. do you think that time and 
those resources could be better spent elsewhere?) 
 
In response to the first question, the overwhelming majority of respondents (thirteen 
out of eighteen) indicated that they did not think the audit system was a hindrance to 
service delivery in any way. They indicated that the audits are quite separate from 
service delivery – measuring only issues of financial compliance. These answers seem 
to suggest that the audits do capture financial compliance capacity but that their 
impact upon service delivery is quite limited, affecting only the targets set and not a 
municipality’s capacity to actually meet them.  
 
This reasoning was echoed by the four respondents that indicated they did think the 
municipal audit system impinged upon service delivery. Issues cited include the 
MFMA over regulating municipal operations, placing too much focus on compliance, 
too little emphasis on service performance and leading to a diversion of resources 
away from service delivery to administrative tasks.                  
 
A similar narrative is found in the answers to the second question, which was whether 
the amount of resources a clean audit requires is worthwhile. The vast majority of 
respondents indicated that they viewed clean audits as being a necessary goal to strive 
towards. Whilst achieving a clean audit is a difficult task that requires a significant 
amount of work, no one is of the view that the audit system should be removed or is 
not necessary. On the contrary, there was a ubiquitous expression of appreciation for 
role audits play to curb corruption and ‘lead to better knowledge and control within 
the organisation.’  
 
However, equally as prevalent was the feeling that, whilst a well-designed and 
effective municipal audit system is very much a necessity, the current system in place 
can be improved in numerous ways. Some relevant comments from the survey 
include:  




“Clean audits are important, because we must be able to manage the finance of the tax payer 
correctly but yes, some of the resources spent on new procedures and advisory consultants 
could be spent better on real hard core service delivery.” 
 
“Clean audits have some value as far as compliance and the correctness of the financials are 
concerned. The audits conducted on achievement of performance is limited as far as measuring 
actual delivery on ground level is concerned. The effort and cost needed to get and maintain a 
clean audit (which focuses more on compliance) does not correlate with actual delivery of 
service which is the core function of a municipality.”  
 
“A clean audit is based on fair financial statements, compliance to laws and regulations and 
the correct reporting of performance achievements. It indicates sound financial administration, 
risk management and good governance and does give some assurance to the public regarding 
the spending of their tax money. But the current audits by the Auditor-General concentrates 
very little on actual service delivery on the ground i.e. measuring actual performance.” 
 
When asked about the biggest barrier municipalities face in terms of achieving clean 
audits, two groups of challenges emerged. Firstly, municipal employees indicated that 
they struggled to source and fund the level of skilled staff able to adequately prepare 
the quality of financial statements needed to achieve a clean audit. Municipalities 
often have to hire in expensive, external experts to assist with auditing preparations.  
Secondly, they face challenges relating to the complexity and multiplicity of 
regulations which limit municipal operations and make it hard to avoid findings being 
made by the Auditor-General for poor compliance. One municipal manager stated 
that municipalities have over 100 prescripts to adhere to and they often struggle to 
keep up with all of them.  
 
In addition to the interference of politicians in municipal operations, almost all 
respondents highlighted financial constraints as being the biggest deterrent to 
delivering services. As was outlined earlier, although a significant amount of 
responsibility has been delegated to the local government tier during South Africa’s 
move to a post-apartheid, decentralized system of governance, this has not necessarily 




been followed by adequate financial decentralization. Municipalities are facing 
increasing demand for services from growing citizen populations yet fewer residents 
are able to pay their rates in constricted financial climates.  
        
It is thus difficult to make conclusive statements about the link between municipal 
audits and service delivery in South Africa, as the variety of opinions outlined earlier  
demonstrate. Whilst the evidence presented thus far seems to suggest that the audits 
are effective at capturing a municipality’s financial management capacity, they appear 
to have limited externalities that positively benefit service delivery performance . 
Some of the biggest constraints facing municipalities are limited finances and a 

























Chapter Seven: An empirical framework for analysing the relationship between 
municipal audit outcomes and levels of service delivery  
 
7.1 Distilling the Research Question  
As discussed, effective local government operations are crucial for economic 
development and growth in South Africa. It is thus surprising that there does not 
appear to a larger body of empirical work assessing the validity of the assumption 
that clean audits, as reflections of financial compliance and effective management 
capacity, improve a municipality’s ability to deliver public services. Currently, it 
seems that the degree to which the benefits of robust financial management spill over 
into other parts of a municipality’s operations is unknown. Nor is it known whether 
the current municipal audit system is effectively designed and implemented to 
achieve its objectives.  
 
Hence, the key research question this thesis will examine is the following:  
 
To what extent does financial compliance, as represented by municipal audit outcomes, explain 
or influence the service delivery performance of a municipality?  
 
This thesis aims to assess firstly, whether a link between those two variables exists 
and if so, how strong the relationship is. Secondary questions that can arise from this 
include whether positive audit outcomes can only be achieved at the expense of 
service delivery targets, whether the benefits associated with positive audit outcomes 
lead to improved service delivery and whether the audit system itself needs to be 
adapted.  
 
7.2 Distilling the Hypothesis 
This thesis has three hypotheses around the relation between municipal audits and 
service delivery.  
 




H0: Local government audit outcomes are positively related to service delivery levels in each 
municipality.  
 
In this case, financial discipline impacts positively on service delivery. Thus, more 
support should be given to municipalities to improve financial management, revenue 
generation and in turn, service delivery capacity.  
 
H1: Local government audit outcomes are negatively related to service delivery levels in each 
municipality. 
 
In this case, the design of the audit system should be altered and perhaps focused 
more towards performance auditing. It should not perversely incentivise the financial 
management team to limit their service delivery activities.  
 
H2: Local government audit outcomes are not related to service delivery levels in each 
municipality.  
 
In this case, responsible management of funds is not enough to improve municipal 
service delivery, and strong financial capacity does not have positive externalities on 
other aspects of municipal operations. This might call for a combined solution of both 
making appropriate adjustments to the municipal audit system and better 
capacitating municipalities to improve service delivery.  
 
7.3 Empirical Strategy  
Although no single publication has examined the questions posed in their entirety, 
there are various papers that attempt to answer different aspects. This thesis has thus 
combined these different methodologies with OLS and fixed effects regressions to 
more holistically explore the relationship between municipal audit outcomes and 
service delivery levels. 
 




Firstly, following the approach taken by Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016), this thesis 
constructs a balanced scorecard against which to measure service delivery 
performance and test for correlation with municipal audit outcomes. Whilst 
Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016) applied their methodology to 2013 data only, this 
thesis analyses data from 2007 and 2011. These years were chosen as they coincide 
with the Statistics SA 2007 community survey and 2011 nationwide census.  
 
To overcome the problems associated with a balanced scorecard, this thesis then 
adopts a similar approach to Krugell et. al (2009), who create principal components 
from the available service delivery data. They use these principal components to run 
various graphical analyses and parametric tests, such as one-way ANOVAs, to 
identify characteristics that differ across municipalities that improved their service 
delivery performance between 2001 and 2007 and those that saw worsening 
performance. This thesis conducts similar analysis however instead of ANOVAs, it 
applies non-parametric Krushkal-Wallis and Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, whilst also 
including a variable that Krugell et al (2009) did not examine – the audit outcomes.  
 
Following this analysis, to explore the explanatory power of municipal audit 
outcomes in relation to service delivery in a municipality – that is, to assess the degree 
to which the benefits associated with financial compliance spills over into other areas 
of municipal performance – this thesis conducted OLS regressions. Although 
satisfying the assumptions behind an OLS regression, endogeneity issues led to the 
final analysis taking the form of fixed effects regressions.  
 
7.4 Data Description   
The data used in this thesis was collected at a nationwide level – covering all 8 
metropolitan, 44 district and 226 local municipalities in South Africa. The unit of 
observation is a single municipality. As the analysis is looking at changes between the 
years 2007 and 2011, the collected data was organised into a panel dataset, with each 
variable having a data point from both years for each observation. Given that the data 




covers the entire population and is not a sample, no weights were needed during the 
analysis.  
 
The South African household and population statistics were sourced from Statistics 
South Africa, specifically the 2007 Community Survey and 2011 nationwide Census. 
Although there is room for human error in its collection, it is one of the most reliable 
sources of such data available, being regulated by the Statistics Act of 1999.   
 
The Municipal Demarcation board supplied the data regarding a municipality’s prior 
homeland or republic status, whilst the Independent Electoral Commission provided 
the voting data. Finally, data reflecting municipal finances was collected from the 
South African National Treasury’s website which hosts annual municipal financial 
records.   
 
The municipal audit outcomes are sourced from the 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 annual 
audit reports prepared by the South African Auditor General, an independent 
regulator tasked with assessing financial and operational compliance levels of South 
African municipalities.  
 
7.5 Data Limitations  
As with all survey data, there are often issues regarding data collection, processing 
and editing techniques. For example, although it has no significant impact upon the 
quality of the data captured, it is noted that the census 2011 has a larger than expected 
undercount, due to a number of people not being able to participate in the survey 
(Schultz, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, a significant limitation of the data obtained from Statistics SA’s sources 
is that it was only available in count form and not at an individual level. For example, 
instead of recording the language of each individual living in a municipality, the 
available data aggregated the number of people in a municipality that spoke a certain 
language at the time of data collection. This means that instead of being able to 




include, for example, a categorical variable indicating the different languages spoken 
in a municipality, this thesis had to include discrete variables indicating the 
percentage of each municipality’s population that speaks a specific language.  
 
It is noted that both the population and household data and the municipal audit 
outcomes are outdated by a number of years. However, it was not possible to analyse 
more recent data as the nationwide censuses are conducted every ten years, meaning 
the next batch of statistics will only be available in 2021. 2011 and 2007 were thus the 
latest two periods of time for which both municipal audit data and population data 
were available. This might influence the relevance of results found in this thesis, as 
the municipal audit system has changed significantly over the years and is 
increasingly focusing on issues of performance.  
 
However, the outcomes determined by mandatory audits still assess criteria that are 
very compliance orientated and disjointed from service delivery performance. Audit 
reports from more recent years may include more information drawn from municipal 
performance reports and internal control mechanisms, but they have not yet reached 
a stage where these factors influence the ultimate audit outcome in the same manner 
as compliance issues.   
 
Finally, measuring performance is often difficult due to the nature of the impact being 
hard to capture quantitatively. Thus, not all relevant variables have been included in 
this thesis due to limited availability or the factors being hard to capture. Observable 
variables – such as numbers of staff – and intangible factors – such as managerial style, 
honesty and motivation levels – were not available to be included in this dataset. 
Hence it is possible that important factors in the audit outcome – service delivery 
relationship are not being captured by this thesis.  
 
7.6 Data Manipulation 
As the data used in this thesis comes from a few different sources, it was necessary to 
first merge each separate database into one main databased before any analysis could 




be conducted. This was done by using the municipal code as the common, identifying 
variable upon which to merge each dataset.  
 
Between 2007 and 2011, various municipal boarder changes took place, resulting in 
the formation of new municipal regions that did not exist in the 2007 Community 
Survey. Thus, numerous municipalities were dropped from the dataset or municipal 
codes altered to ensure the data conforms to the latest 2011 municipal boundaries. The 
changes made are described in table one of the appendix.  
 
7.6.1 Outliers and Missing data  
Although not part of the OLS assumptions, outlying and missing data points are also 
able to bias results. To deal with this, points of outlying and leveraged observations 
were identified by plotting both sets on a horizontal and vertical axis respectively and 
highlighting the extreme values. These were points were then correlated against 
points of influence, and those that fell into all three categories were removed from the 
OLS regressions. These removed observations are listed in table two and three of the 
appendix.    
 
Missing data was not an issue with this dataset. However, it was noted that not all the 
observations were being included in the OLS regressions as Stata only includes 
observations which have data for all the selected variables. It is important that the 
missing observations are excluded randomly and there are no underlying trends in 
the missing data that could bias the results. This paper thus checked whether the 
missing values are related to the dependent variable, the results of which ultimately 
lead to variables being removed from the regression if their missing data points 
significantly impacted upon the dependent variable. Therefore, the final regression 








Chapter Eight: A preliminary analysis of the relationship between municipal audit 
outcomes and levels of service delivery using the balanced scorecard approach  
 
8.1 What is a balanced scorecard?  
As a starting point, it must first be established whether there is in fact a link between 
municipal audit outcomes and service delivery indicators. Aadnesgaard and Willows 
(2016) examine this exact question by adapting traditional corporate scorecards to 
suitably evaluate municipal service delivery. The purpose of using a scorecard is to 
create a categorical ranking of service delivery performance which can then be used 
to test for correlation against the categorical municipal audit outcomes.  
 
They define these balanced score cards as “strategic management systems that link 
performance measurement to strategy using a multidimensional set of financial and 
nonfinancial performance metrics,” and point out that they “are becoming more 
widely accepted in evaluating corporate performance due to sustainability being 
dependent on a rounded approach to business” (Aadnesgaard & Willows, 2016 ; 
Epstein & Wisner, 2001 (2)). Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016) chose to adapt the 
specific balanced scorecard of Severn Trent Water Ltd, a British water, waste and 
utility systems service provider, which they felt closely resembled the core operations 




 Education  
 Housing quality 
 
8.2 Creating a balanced scorecard for municipal service delivery  
Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016) thus adapt this scorecard to examine municipal 
service delivery, according to selected municipal duties outlined in Schedule Four of 
the Constitution (1996) which they deem to be ‘essential.’ Weighted around the 
median levels of service delivery, they give each indicator a score out of five and then 




average these scores out to produce an overall service delivery rating. Consequently, 
the ratings are correlated against municipal audit outcomes to assess whether there is 
a relationship between the two variables. 
 
As outlined earlier, Schedule Four of the South African Constitution lists 
approximately 15 areas of municipal responsibility and Section 152 in chapter 7 
charges municipalities with the duty to provide services to their communities in a 
sustainable manner (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No 108, 1996). Only 
a selection of these areas of responsibility have been used as service delivery 
indicators in this thesis, in line with available data and work done by Aadnesgaard & 
Willows (2016) and Krugell et al (2009).  
 
Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016) selected their variables according to ‘fundamental 
service provisions so as to not skew data in light of minor service provisions.’ Their 
decision as to what services should be classified as fundamental was informed by 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, with emphasis placed on ‘physiological needs’ such as 
‘shelter, sanitation, refuse removal, lighting and access to water’ (Aadnesgaard and 
Willows, 2016).  The variables selected to represent municipal service delivery in this 
thesis are thus the following:  
 
 Percentage of households in brick dwellings  
 Percentage of households with access to electricity for cooking, heating and 
lighting 
 Percentage of households with access to weekly refuse removal  
 Percentage of households that have access to internal piped water 
 Percentage of households that have a flushing sewage system 
 
These variables were also used by Krugell et al (2009) and Le Roux Booysen (2003). 
Furthermore, they lend themselves to being used in a comparison across 
municipalities as these are common core responsibilities where as others, such as 
ensuring public health and safety, are undertaken by a limited number of 




municipalities or managed by higher levels of government (Aadnesgaard and 
Willows, 2016). Aadnesgaard and Willows (2016) also included unemployment rates 
as an indication of economic development and to account for the effect that 
employment has upon access to services levels. Higher employment rates are 
indicative of higher levels of income in an area, which enables residents to purchase 
basic services themselves or enables municipalities to provide more services due to a 
stable flow of income via rates payments (Aadnesgaard and Willows, 2016).  
 
The following table lays out the weighting used for each indicator to create the overall 
service delivery score for each municipality:  
 









Weightings used 2011 
(Based on % of municipal 
population receiving that 
service)1 
 
Weightings used 2007 
(Based on % of 
municipal population 
receiving that service) 
Piped Water 
Inside Dwelling 
2011:  36.26 % 
 















                                                 
1 The middle weighting was determined according to the average national levels of access to a specific service 
delivery indicator – hence a middle percentage band, based on this national average score, was allocated to a 
rating of ‘three.’ The rest of the ratings were evenly allocated to access bands above and below the average. In 
other words, taking piped water as an example, in 2011, on average 36.26% of South Africans had access to 
piped water within their homes. Hence, any municipality in which 30%-50% of the constituency had access to 
piped household water then received a rating of three for that service delivery indicator. If less than 30% has 
access, they got a score of 0,1 or 2 and if more than 50% had access, they got a score of 4 or 5. The scores for 
each service delivery indicator were averaged out to produce the overall score.   









2007: 58.30 % 
 
5: 80-100 








































































2007: 35.84 % 
 






















5: 90 -100 
4: 80 - 90 
3: 70 - 80 
2: 50 - 70 
1: 25 - 50 
0: 0 – 25 
5: 85 – 100 
4: 75 -85 
3: 65 -75 
2: 50 - 65 
1: 25 -50 
0: 0 – 25 
 
It should be noted that whilst the majority of variables listed in table two were 
standalone variables in the Stats SA database, Brick Dwellings is the sum of a few 
relevant housing variables, namely:  
 
 House or brick structure on a separate stand or yard  
 Flat in block of flats 
 Town/Cluster/Semi-detached house 
 House/Flat/room in backyard  
 Room/flatlet not in backyard but on a shared property  
 Servants Quarters/Granny Flat 
 
According to the weightings as per the last two columns in table two, each service 
delivery indicator was given a score out of five. These were then averaged over all the  
indicators to produce a service delivery score for each municipality.  
 
8.3 Examining the service delivery and audit outcome scores  
Figure 14 contrasts each municipality’s service delivery score against its audit score 
for both 2007 and 2011. The audit results achieved by the municipalities are captured 
in a categorical variable, where a one represents the worst possible outcome 
(Disclaimer) and a five represents the best possible outcome (Unqualified with No 
Findings).   
In a case of perfect correlation, a municipality should receive roughly the same score 
for both performance metrics (each out of five), which would see the orange (bottom) 
and blue (top) lines in figure fourteen each contribute 50% towards the total 




municipality’s score (out of ten), as represented on the y axis. In other words, the lines 
in the figure fourteen should all be meeting in the middle of the graph. Whilst this is 
the case in a number of them, it is also clear to see many points where one score is 
much higher than another, leading to the spikes and troughs visible across 
municipalities in both years. Hence, there appears to be a significant amount of 

























Source: Statistics SA, 2007 & 2011; Auditor General Reports 2007 & 2011 
























































































































































































































































































































8.4 Testing relationships between the scores  
To assess the relationship between the two variables, chi-squared tests were run. A 
chi-squared test is used when one is looking for correlation between two categorical 
variables, and wanting to assess whether their distributions are different from one 
another (Wooldridge, 2015). The test uses the null hypothesis that the two variables 
are independent whilst the alternative hypothesis is that they are related. It produces 
a Pearson Chi-Squared statistic and a p-value, which indicates whether one can reject 
the null hypothesis depending on its relation to a set level of significance, which is 
usually set at 5%.  
  
It is also important to note that the chi-squared test assumes that the expected value 
of each cell in a correlation table is greater than five. As this is not the case with the 
data above in its current form, this thesis collapsed the variables into just two 
categories each to satisfy this assumption. The service delivery variable was turned 
into a dummy variable – with a one given to municipalities delivering more than 
median levels of services (those achieving a 4 or 5) and a zero given to the others. The 
same approach was applied to the audit outcome variables, where a one was given to 
municipalities achieving an unqualified with findings or clean audit and a zero was 
given to all the others.  
 
A further assumption of the chi-squared test is that the groups of data being tested are 
independent from one another in the sense that they are not matched pairs capturing 
changes before and after a treatment. The data used by this thesis meets this 












8.4.1 Results from the Chi-squared test 
Table 3: Chi-Squared Test of Independence  




P-value 0.300 0.113 
 
According to the p-values in table three, in both 2007 and 2011, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected (at the 10% significant level) and there does not appear to be a 
statistically significant relationship between the audit outcomes and level of service 
delivery. Due to various possible errors in the construction of the variables however, 
these results may not be robust.  
   
The same analysis is thus repeated using Cramer’s V test. This allows for the testing 
of correlation in tables that have more than two columns and more than two rows, as 
was the case in the original data (Wooldridge, 2015). This test is also useful as it 
provides extra information, not only indicating whether there is a relationship 
between variables but also showing how strong the relationship is. It produces a test 
statistic between zero and one, with one indicating a strong relationship and a zero 
indicating no relationship. The results from Cramer’s V were the following  (table 4):  
 
Table 4 Cramer's V Test  
 2007 2011 




Cramer’s V produces the same results as the pearson chi-squared correlation in table 
three. It indicates that there is a weak relationship between the audit outcomes and 
municipal levels of service delivery, although the relationship is stronger in 2011 than 
it is in 2007. Once more though, these results cannot be taken as entirely accurate as 




there are several points of potential error in the formation of the variables. For 
example, the choice of ranking categories for service delivery across municipalities 
was done fairly subjectively and is perhaps not an accurate reflection of the true 
situation. Furthermore, using averages to represent the levels of service delivery has 
obvious flaws, capturing a mere snapshot of the situation and excluding many of the 
municipalities that fall outside of the mid region. The aggregation of information 
results in less accurate information. The next chapter thus conducts more robust forms 



























Chapter Nine:  Assessing the significance of municipal audit outcomes in terms of 
changes in service delivery using principal component analysis   
 
The service delivery variable thus needs to be improved in order to undertake more 
robust analysis. Krugell et. al (2009) offer one way to do this in their paper examining 
the progress of service delivery across municipalities in South Africa. They employ a 
non-parametric econometric tool called principal component analysis (PCA) – a 
method that creates indexes representing a weighted linear combination of several 
variables so as to maximise their variance (Jolliffe, 2002). PCA is a suitable method to 
create an aggregated service delivery variable as it reduces points of data into a single 
component that can be used to represent the combined information of the group.  
 
This thesis thus follows a similar method to the work of Krugell et al (2009) and first 
checks for correlation between the variables – they must be related but not exactly. 
Drawing once more on data from the Stats SA Community Survey and Census for 
2007 and 2011 for all local municipalities in South Africa, a correlation test was run on 
the same service delivery indicators used earlier in this paper:   
 
 Piped Water Inside Dwelling 
 Electricity for Cooking 
 Electricity for Lighting  
 Electricity for Heating  
 Flushing Toilet System 
 Refuse Removed Weekly 
 Brick Dwellings  
 
Krugell et al (2009) highlighted correlation values of 0.9 or higher, removing those 
variables from the principal component calculation. Similarly, this thesis found that 
for both 2007 and 2011, ‘Refuse Removed Weekly’ was highly correlated  (correlation 
value greater than 0.9) with ‘Flushing Toilet System.’ In 2007, The ‘Flushing Toilet 
System’ was also highly correlated with ‘Piped Water Inside Dwelling,’ as was 




‘Electricity for Cooking’ with ‘Electricity for Heating’ (both pairs have correlation 
values greater than 0.9). Hence, a correlation value of 0.9 was set as the cut off, 
resulting in the ‘Flushing Toilet System’ and ‘Electricity for Heating’ variables being 
dropped from the formation of the principal component. The final variables used in 
the PCA analysis were the following: 
 
 Piped Water Inside Dwelling 
 Electricity for Cooking 
 Electricity for Lighting  
 Refuse Removed Weekly 
 Brick Dwellings  
 
9.1 Preliminary Tests  
The next step in the analysis, as per Krugell et al (2009), is to test the appropriateness 
of PCA, given the chosen variables. There are two tests that can be used to do this – 
Bartlett’s sphericity test and the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy. Both check 
similar aspects in slightly different ways, with the main aim being to assess whether 
it is apt to summarise the variables into a single principal component.  
 
Bartlett’s sphericity test essentially evaluates the similarity between the correlation 
matrix and the identity matrix of the variables. If these two matrices are the same, PCA 
is not suitable as it means there are no extra variables that can be represented by 
another. In other words, if there is a high level of correlation between the two, but they 
are not exactly the same, then one variable can be used as representative summary of 
the others. Should the two matrices mirror each other, then the variables cannot be 
reduced into a single component as each holds unique information requiring 
individual representation. The output from this test can be found in table four of the 
appendix, which returned significant results, meaning the null hypothesis that the 
correlation matrix is the same as the identity matrix can be rejected.  
   




As mentioned, the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy also assesses whether PCA 
is suitable however, it does so by checking whether the correlation between two 
variables is influenced by partial correlation from other variables or common variance. 
Strong patterns of correlation are desirable, as this makes the summation of the 
variables into principal components more effective and reliable (Krugell et al., 2009). 
The test produces a statistic between zero and one, with a value closer to one being 
preferable as this indicates higher levels of correlation between variables. This output 
is included in table five of the appendix, where the test returns a statistic of 0.805 and 
0.77 in 2007 and 2011 respectively. This is comparable to the results of the Krugell et 
al (2009) thesis, which found KMO statistics of 0.805 and 0.820 in 2001 and 2007 
respectively. Hence, the evidence indicates that PCA is an appropriate analysis to run.  
 
9.2 Creating the Principal Components 
The next step was to actually create the principal components. Bentzen and Nielsen 
(2014) describe this process as new variables being created “from weighted sums of 
the original variables” where “the weights and the components are respectively 
referred to as loadings (eigenvectors) and scores (eigenvalues).”  
 
Each principal component represents a linear combination of the underlying 
variables, weighted in such a manner that the total variance captured by each 
component is maximised.  These weightings are displayed in table six of the appendix 
and are called eigenvectors. Eigenvectors provide an indication of the component 
meanings, depending on which variables are more heavily weighted.  
 
The amount of variance each component captures is represented by a number called 
an ‘eigenvalue.’ As the first component does not always capture enough variance, it 
is common for more than one component to be retained for the prediction of principal 
component scores. For example, as demonstrated in table seven of the appendix, this 
thesis’ first component captures 78% and 74% in 2007 and 2011 respectively, whilst 
the second component captures 13% and 15% respectively. The variance captured by 
the rest of the components is negligible. Thus, before progressing to predict principal 




component scores, it must first be decided how many variables will be retained in this 
calculation.  
 
9.3 Selecting Components to be Retained  
As outlined by Bentzen and Nielsen (2014) but also found in various econometric texts 
– there are four different ways to decide on which components to keep.  
 
Firstly, one can follow the interpretability criterion, which sets out various guidelines 
for assessing components. These refer to the minimum number of variables that need 
to be significant for inclusion into components, what their loading structure should 
look like and what they should be measuring (Jolliffe,2002). 
 
Secondly, the Kaiser criterion can be followed, which states that only components with 
an eigenvalue greater than one should be retained. With the point of principal 
component analysis being to reliably reduce a group of variables into a single 
representative component, it only makes sense to retain components that have 
eigenvalues greater than one – those that capture more variance than a single variable 
represents (Jolliffe, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, components can be chosen according to the amount of variance they capture, 
with a minimum amount being set as a threshold. This is normally set at 70-80% of the 
variance (Bentzen & Nielsen, 2014).  Lastly, components can be chosen according to 
the scree test, which plots out the size of each component’s eigenvalues. In most scree 
tests, there is a break or ‘elbow’ in the graph that is used as the cut-off point for 
component selection. Larger components that appear before the break are retained 
whilst the smaller ones after the break are not (Bentzen & Nielsen, 2014). 
 
It is recommended that all four tests are applied, which in the case of this thesis led to 
only the first component being retained for both 2007 and 2011. The first component 
captures a significant amount of the variance in both 2007 and 2011, as shown in table 
four.  It is also located before the ‘elbow’ in the scree test (Figure One and Two in the 




appendix) and is the only component to have an eigenvalue greater than one across 
both years.  
 
9.4 Rotating and Interpreting Components  
Before predicting final principal component scores from the retained components, it 
is customary to rotate them for ease of interpretation. Rotation results in the variance 
being equally spread across the retained components and transforms the patterns of 
the variable weightings into a simple structure (Bentzen & Nielsen, 2014). A simple 
structure refers to the way in which the component rotation matrix is organised, 
including certain characteristics such as each variable having at least one zero 
weighting and only a small amount of variables having positive weightings in more 
than one coloum (Jolliffe, 2002). This assists with interpreting the components, as their 
meaning depends on the spread of weights across their variables and a simple 
structure makes this weighting spread easier to see.  
 
However, in the case where just one component is retained, as has occurred in this 
paper, rotation is not necessary and the meaning of the single component can be 
derived from its original eigenvectors. Therefore, looking at the spread of eigenvectors 
in table seven of the appendix, it is clear that equal weighting has been placed on all 
five of the underlying variables. The result is a ‘mixed’ component which can be 
interpreted as capturing a measure of overall service delivery levels within a 
municipality, without a specific focus on any one type of service. The service delivery 
principal component scores used in further analysis in this paper have been predicted 
from this single, retained component. 
 
9.5 Grouping Local Municipalities according to Service Delivery Principal 
Component Scores 
In line with Krugell et al (2009)’s work, the predicted service delivery principal 
component scores are displayed in figure fifteen. Each plotted observation represents 
a municipality, with the vertical axis showing its service delivery score for 2011 whilst 
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it’s score for 2007 is plotted against the horizontal axis. The individual scores can be 
found in tables eight to eleven in the appendix.  
 
Given the layout of the scores on the graph, quadrant one includes the municipalities 
that delivered improved levels of services between 2007 and 2011, as their scores 
changed from negative to positive over that period of time. Conversely, quadrant four 
displays those entities that saw levels of service delivery decline, with their scores 
changing from positive to negative between 2007 and 2011. The municipalities 
situated in quadrants two and three are those that performed consistently positively 



















The evident trend of the graph seems to indicate a general upwards movement of 
municipalities towards quadrant two and an overall improvement in municipal 
service delivery. Indeed, the majority of municipalities are clustered in this quadrant, 
Figure 15: Scatter Plot of Principal Component Service Delivery Indexes 




consistently achieving positive service delivery scores. Furthermore, the wide spread 
of municipalities in quadrant three is a noticeable change from the graph produced by 
Krugell et al (2009), which has a fairly equal distribution of municipalities across the 
2nd and 3rd quadrant, and scores greater than negative two for both years.  
 
9.6 Correlated movements – Do municipal audit outcomes and levels of service 
delivery change in conjunction with one another in local municipalities?  
Restricting the analysis now to examine local municipalities alone – not only to avoid 
outlying metropolitan municipal data skewing the results, but also to more closely 
examine the group with the worst municipal performance and most variance in 
outcomes – table five displays the municipal groupings according to service delivery 
scores across 2007 and 2011:  
 










of SA Population 
(2011) 
Consistently Negative 61 26.87% 17.23% 
Worsening 20 8.81% 3.37% 
Consistently Positive 118 51.98% 34.55% 
Improving 28 12.33% 6.97% 
Total Local 
Municipalities 
227 100% 61.91% 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that table six does simplify the changes in service delivery somewhat, as 
even those municipalities that consistently scored positively or negatively with respect to 
service delivery, often experienced movements in these scores. Examining the absolute 
movements, between 2007 and 2011, 120 local municipalities experienced declining service 
delivery scores whilst 105 local municipalities experienced improved service delivery scores.  
These numbers differ to those displayed in table seven.  
 




Trends displayed in table five support figure fifteen, with the majority of local 
municipalities not seeing many changes in terms of service delivery and a handful 
improving or declining in terms of their performance. The largest grouping of 
municipalities falls in the ‘consistently positive’ category, affecting approximately  
34.55% of the entire South African population, which is marginally greater than half 
the amount of people living in local municipal jurisdictions. Furthermore, the second 
largest group – the local municipalities that consistently scored negatively in terms of 
service delivery – accounts for 26.87% of the municipalities in the sample and is home 
to 17.23% of the South African population. On the whole, roughly 20% of the South 
African population lives in municipal jurisdictions that have negative or worsening 
service delivery scores, whilst about 40% of South Africans are part of municipal areas 
that improved or scored consistently positively. The last two groups, the 
municipalities that experienced changes in service delivery scores, represent roughly 
21% of South Africa’s local municipalities but account for just 10% of the country’s 
population.  
 
To contextualise this information with respect to this thesis’ hypothesis, it should be 
compared to changes in local municipal audit outcomes, as displayed in table seven. 
In keeping with the evidence presented in this thesis thus far, table six shows that 















Table 6: Categorisation of Local Municipalities according to changes in Audit Outcomes 
between 2007 and 2011 
Audit Outcomes 
Number of local 
Municipalities 
Percentage of local 
Municipalities 
Approximate 
Percentage of SA 
Population (2011) 
Consistently Negative 51 22.47% 13.07% 
Worsening 41 18.06% 12.57% 
Consistently Positive 63 27.75% 16.57% 
Improving 73 32.16% 19.79% 
Total Local 
Municipalities 
227 100% 62.00% 
 
Firstly, table six has a more even distribution of municipalities across the four 
categories. It appears that far more local municipalities are achieving consistently 
positive or consistently negative service delivery scores than consistently positive or 
negative audit outcomes. It would thus seem that whilst the majority of local 
municipalities are experiencing few changes in service delivery, more movement is 
taking place in terms of municipal audit outcomes.   
 
In contrast to the 12.33% of local municipalities experiencing improved service 
delivery levels, 32.16% achieved improved audit outcomes between 2007 and 2011. In 
addition, a far greater portion of the South African population (19.79%) live in a 
municipal area that achieved strengthening audit outcomes compared to the 
percentage of South Africans (6.97%) that experienced improved levels of service 
delivery.  Conversely, 18.06% of local municipalities, accounting for 12.57% of South 
Africans, achieved weakening audit outcomes in comparison to the 8.81% that had 
worse levels of service delivery in 2011 than in 2007 (accounting for 3.37% of the 
population). Furthermore, table six shows that although there may still be very few 
municipalities achieving clean audit outcomes, a significant amount are either scoring 
consistently positively or are improving in terms of the outcomes they achieve.  
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It is still unclear though whether these movements across the two variables are related 
to one another. The following graphs attempt to explore this further and assess 
whether service delivery and municipal audit outcomes move in correlation with one 
another.      
 















Figure 17: Changes in Service Delivery across municipalities with improved and weakened 






























Whilst 34.3% of municipalities that improved in terms of service delivery also 
achieved improved municipal audit outcomes, 13.4% of them received worse audit 
outcomes and 52.2% of them saw no change in their audit results. Of the 
municipalities that had deteriorated service delivery performance, 30.9% had 
improving audit outcomes, 20.8% had worse audit outcomes and 48.2% had no 
change.  
 
With regards to municipalities that had improved audit outcomes between 2007 and 
2011, 51.6% also improved in terms of service delivery whilst 48.3% experienced 
declining levels of service delivery. On the other hand, for the municipalities that had 
worse audit outcomes in 2011 compared to 2007, 38.2% had improved levels of service 
delivery and 61.7% had worse levels.  
 
These figures make it clear that when a municipality improves or declines in terms of 
service delivery performance, there is no similar movement in audit outcomes. In fact, 
the bar graphs in figure sixteen look almost identical for both groups of municipality 
service delivery scores, with the majority group in both being no change in audit 
outcomes. On the other hand, there does seem to be a slightly closer correlation when 
the data is examined from a different perspective. As figure seventeen shows, 
municipalities achieving improved audit outcomes had greater numbers of improved 
service delivery scores whilst those that achieved worse audit outcomes had more 
municipalities with declining service delivery scores.   
 
Although the graphical analysis is very rudimentary and it’s difficult to make a 
conclusive statement from these trends about directional movements, the numbers do 
not appear to indicate that the two variables move in the same direction or by the same 
amount, and perhaps provide preliminary evidence of the disconnect between 
municipal audit outcomes and levels of service delivery.  Further analysis must be 
conducted to assess whether there is a correlation between the two variables, and 
whether changes in service delivery are linked to any corresponding changes in audit 
outcomes.  




9.7 Why not use a difference-in-difference regression?  
A difference-in-difference regression would be an ideal extension of the basic analysis 
already conducted to assess whether the two variables move in conjunction with one 
another. However, such regressions are founded on the assumption that an 
intervention is applied at random to a treatment group, the effect of which can then 
be compared to a control group.  
 
Whilst it is possible to separate municipalities out into treatment and control groups 
according to which of them experienced improving audit outcomes between 2007 and 
2011, the random intervention assumption would not hold because the change in 
audit outcomes did not happen arbitrarily. Rather, improved or worsened outcomes 
are a result of changes in municipal capacity, management and operations. These are 
functions of the larger ecosystem within which the municipalities operate, and are not 
distributed randomly across entities nor are these effects easily quantifiable.  
Furthermore, whilst there are clearly factors at play in the proposed treatment group 
that lead to their improved outcomes, these were not necessarily only applied or 
available to that group specifically.  
 
The effects captured in a difference-in-difference regression would thus not be able to 
isolate the real reasons behind changes in some municipality not being seen in others, 
and it would be a better idea to conduct further research to identify these factors than 













Chapter Ten: Do audit outcomes make a difference? Identifying differing 
characteristics between the different municipal groupings  
 
10.1 Test for differences between groups – the start of an empirical analysis  
This thesis will now move to more empirical methods of assessing the relationship 
between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery scores – specifically whether 
the municipal audit outcomes differ across the municipal groupings in figure sixteen 
and seventeen.  Of particular interest to the hypothesis of in question are the 
municipalities situated in quadrant one and four of figure fifteen – those that 
improved their scores from one year to the next (quadrant one) or worsened (quadrant 
four). Krugell et al (2009) focused on these two groups of municipalities and ran a 
series of one-way analysis of variance tests (ANOVAs) to “examine the differences in 
the characteristics of those places that provided below average delivery and those that 
improved delivery.” ANOVAs identify the factors that differentiate municipalities 
performing well in terms of service delivery from those that perform poorly. 
However, as ANOVA tests are parametric and this dataset is non-normal and 
heteroscedastic, a non-parametric alternative – the Kruskal-Wallis H test - is applied 
instead. 
 
The Municipal Capacity Assessment conducted by the MDB in 2010/2011 highlights 
three ‘interdependent but distinct’ factors that have a significant impact upon local 
government performance. These include “the context in which a municipality finds 
itself, representative of the socio-geographic and legacy factors that constrain the 
ability of a municipality to perform; the capacity and resources that it employs and 
the leadership behaviours of councillors and heads of the executive.” The set of factors 
chosen for examination are meant to capture these distinct characteristics of 
municipalities’ operating environments that impact upon its ability to provide 
services. The dependent variables thus all relate to education and ages levels, 
employment and population density rates of a municipality. For the purposes of this 
thesis’ research question, the audit outcomes from the 2011 audit have also been 




included to assess whether these differ between strong and poorly performing 
municipalities.  
The municipal groupings used in this test are the same as those presented in table six, 
and are once again restricted to only include local municipalities. District and 
Metropolitan municipalities are thus not included in the following tests. The initial 
analysis is conducted across all four groups of local municipalities, as reflected in table 
six, and tests the null hypothesis that the included variables do not differ across the 
different groupings of municipal performance in terms of service delivery scores.  
  
However, as the results in table eleven of the appendix show, this null hypothesis is 
rejected for most of the included variables. The average value for the gender, 
education and income levels and population density variables all differ across the 
groupings of municipalities, classified according to service delivery performance. 
Conversely, the number of households in each local municipality and the percentage 
of elderly people are not significant at a probability level of p < 0.10. This means that 
these factors do not differ across the four groups of local municipalities and appear to 
have no relation to service delivery capacity of municipalities.  
 
These results will be taken into account when selecting control variables in the 
regression run later in this thesis, as they provide insight into the context of different 
municipal operating environments. To gain a better understanding of the dynamics 
between them and municipal service delivery performance, it must first be 
determined whether these trends apply equally to all four groupings of 
municipalities.  
 
10.2 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test analysis  
As the specific interest of this thesis is on those municipalities that either improved or 
deteriorated in terms of their service delivery, an independent group t-test will be 
conducted. It is more suitable than ANOVAs, as it allows for differences in the mean 
of the dependent variable to be assessed across these two particular groups. To deal 




with the non-normality of the data and the audit outcomes, a non-parametric version 
of the t-test is conducted – namely, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.  
The output from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is displayed in table seven and eight. It 
has been applied twice – first to the consistently strong and weak municipalities and 
then to the improving and worsening groups of municipalities. It is again testing the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in the dependent variable across the two 
groups of municipalities.  
  
Table 7: Results from Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for municipalities that consistently scored 
positively or negatively in terms of service delivery performance 
Characteristic 
Dependent Variable  
Rank Sum   
 
Expected Sum  
 
Z Stat   
 
Prob > |z| 
Sex ratio (%)  
Strong 11411.5 10354.5 -3.313 0.0009 
Weak  4164.5 5221.5 
Audit outcomes in 2011  
Strong 9738.5 10620 2.823 0.0048 
Weak  6371.5 5490 
% Female Headed households 
Strong 7959.5 10354.5 7.506 0.0000 
Weak  7616.5 5221.5 
% Working age 
Strong 12798.5 10354.5 -7.660 0.0000 
Weak  2777.5 5221.5 
% Youth 
Strong 7793 10354.5 8.028 0.0000 
Weak  7783 5221.5 
% Elderly 
Strong 10831.5 10354.5 -1.495 0.1348 
Weak  4744.5 5221.5 




% No schooling 
Strong 11388.5 10354.5 -3.241 0.0012 
Weak  4187.5 5221.5 
% Higher education 
Strong 10839 10354.5 -1.519 0.1288 
Weak  4797 5221.5 
% Matric 
Strong 11180.50 10354.5 -2.589 0.0096 
Weak  4395.5 5221.5 
% of population 2011 
Strong 10133 10620 1.482 0.1383 
Weak  5977 5490 
% of population 2007 
Strong 9898 10620 2.197 0.0280 
Weak  6212 5490 
Population Density (persons per km2) 
Strong 9159.5 10354.5 3.746 0.0002 
Weak  6416.5 5221.5 
No of households 
Strong 10398.5 10354.5 -0.138 0.8903 
Weak  5177.5 5221.5 
Growth rate (of people from 2001-2011) 
Strong 11796.5 10354.5 -4.519 0.0000 
Weak  3779.5 5221.5 
No of agricultural households 
Strong 8907 10354.5 4.536 0.0000 
Weak  6669 5221.5 
Average household size (People) 
Strong 8041 10354.5 7.267 0.0000 
Weak  7535 5221.5 




% Formal dwelling 
Strong 13732.5 10354.5 -10.587 0.0000 
Weak  1843.5 5221.5 
% Housing owned / Paying off 
Strong 9911 10354.5  
1.390 
0.1645 
Weak  5665 5221.5 
Mean annual household income (R) 
Strong 12981 10620 -7.185 0.0000 
Weak  3129 5490 
Dependency ratio (%) 
Strong 7909 10354.5 7.664 0.0000 
Weak  7667 5221.5 
Unemployment rate 
Strong 8684.5 10354.5 5.234 0.0000 
Weak  6891.5 5221.5 
Youth unemployment rate 
Strong 8870.5 10354.5 4.651 0.0000 
Weak  6705.5 5221.5 
  
All the factors listed in table seven differ across the two groups of municipalities that 
had consistently strong or poor service delivery performance, apart from five. These 
were the percentage of houses owned or being paid off, the number of households in 
each local municipality, the percentage of people aged twenty or above with higher 
education, and the percentage of the population in 2011 and the percentage of elderly 
people living in each municipality. These five factors were all insignificant at a 
probability level of p < 0.05, indicating that the population density and number of 




older or tertiary educated citizens do not impact, if at all, upon a municipality’s 
operations in the same way as the other significant factors.  
Table eight extends the analysis to the groups of municipalities that worsened or 
improved their service delivery, assessing whether the same significant characteristics 
are found.  
 
Table 8: Results from Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for municipalities that scored better or worse 
in terms of service delivery performance 
Characteristic 
Dependent Variable  
Rank Sum   
 
Expected Sum  
 
Z Stat   
 
Prob > |z| 
Sex ratio (%)  
Worsened 450.5 490 -0.826 0.4088 
Improved  725.5 686 
Audit outcomes in 2011  
Worsened 427.5 490 -1.398 0.1622 
Improved  748.5 686 
% Female Headed households 
Worsened 397.5 490 -1.935 0.0530 
Improved  778.5 686 
% Working age 
Worsened 554 490 1.339 0.1807 
Improved  622 686 
% Youth 
Worsened 445 490 -0.941 0.3466 
Improved  731 686 
% Elderly 
Worsened 427 490 -1.319 0.1873 
Improved  749 686 
% No schooling 




Worsened 484 490 -0.125 0.9001 
Improved  692 686 
% Higher education 
Worsened 559.5 490 1.455 0.1458 
Improved  616.5 686 
% Matric 
Worsened 458 490 -0.669 0.5033 
Improved  718 686 
% of population 2011 
Worsened 409 490 -1.694 0.0903 
Improved  767 686 
% of population 2007 
Worsened 376 490 -2.384 0.0171 
Improved  800 686 
Population Density (persons per km2) 
Worsened 393 490 -2.029 0.0424 
Improved  783 686 
No of households 
Worsened 399 490 -1.903 0.0570 
Improved  777 686 
Growth rate (of people from 2001-2011) 
Worsened 618 490 2.677 0.0074 
Improved  558 686 
No of agricultural households 
Worsened 363 490 -2.656 0.0079 
Improved  813 686 
Average household size (People) 
Worsened 493 490 0.063 0.9497 
Improved  683 686 
% Formal dwelling 




Worsened 662 490 3.597 0.0003 
Improved  514 686 
% Housing owned / Paying off 
Worsened 383.5 490 -2.227 0.0259 
Improved  732.5 686 
Mean annual household income (R) 
Worsened 598 490 2.259 0.0239 
Improved  578 686 
Dependency ratio (%) 
Worsened 426.5 490 -1.328 0.1842 
Improved  749.5 686 
Unemployment rate 
Worsened 357 490 -2.782 0.0054 
Improved  819 686 
Youth unemployment rate 
Worsened 361.5 490 -2.687 0.0072 
Improved  814.5 686 
 
Interestingly, table eight demonstrates that many of the municipal characteristics that 
were significant in table seven become insignificant when assessed across only 
municipalities that achieved worse or improved service delivery scores. A clear trend 
in this preliminary evidence is that the municipalities scoring consistently positively 
or negatively in terms of service delivery operate in very different contexts. However, 
when examining which of these contextual factors are related to service delivery, it 
appears that a municipality’s capacity to provide public services is mainly affected by 
regional wealth and population density levels, as well as the extent to which an area 
is urbanised.  
 
Of most significance to the hypothesis of this thesis is the fact that audit outcomes 
appear to differ between municipalities with consistently poor or strong service 
delivery performance, but do not change for those municipalities that experienced 




variations in their service delivery scores. These results are not only in line with trends 
displayed in figure sixteen but reflect a potential disconnect between the audit 
outcomes and service delivery performance in municipalities.  
 
Delving deeper into table eight, the results show that the gender distribution, age and 
education profiles – whilst different for the municipal groupings in table seven – do 
not change across the municipal groupings in table eight. The percentage of residents 
with higher education was in fact insignificant in both tables. The factors that do 
change in table eight, and thus appear to be related to changes in service delivery 
scores, include citizen income levels, unemployment rates, the level of demand for 
services (as measured by the number of houses and people in a municipal region) and 
the type of housing available.  
 
This provides supporting evidence for the theory that municipal service delivery is 
largely a function of the amount of revenue each local government can generate, 
which in turn depends on the wealth and employment levels of its constituents.  For 
example, it is interesting that the percentage of female headed households is 
significant in both tables. As greater levels of female headed households in an area are 
linked to higher levels of poverty (Rogan, 2014; Magongo, 2016), this result reinforces 
the theory that municipal rates revenues are a significant determining factor of service 
delivery.  
 
Furthermore, the type of housing available in a municipality also impacts upon service 
delivery, as it is easier for municipalities to provide brick houses with, for instance, 
running water and electricity than it is to service informal shacks or sparse agricultural 
areas.  Finally, greater levels of population density are representative of urban areas, 
in which there are greater levels of service delivery demand and residents are likely 
to have more disposable income, enabling them to pay for higher quality services 
(Mahabir, 2012).  
 




Hence, the preliminary evidence from tables seven and eight suggest that whilst audit 
outcomes do reflect service delivery performance in some cases, in others there is a 
disconnect between the two variables, particularly in scenarios where levels of service 
delivery fluctuated between 2007 and 2011. This might be due to the fact that levels of 
service delivery are more a function of municipal income levels and demand for public 
services than they are related to the performance management effect of the audits.  
 
In other words, municipal audit outcomes are often reflections of a municipality’s  
performance in terms of delivering public services. However, their impact upon 
service delivery appears to be limited and the relationship between the two variables 
becomes even weaker in cases where municipalities are lacking key operational 
resources. Thus, the results of tables seven and eight serve as early evidence that good 
financial management does not “permeate into the outer spheres of performance and 
service delivery” (Aadnesgaard & Willows, 2016) in municipalities, as service delivery 
is more determined by other factors such as municipal revenue or staff capacity.  This 
is problematic in light of the cost and resources demanded by the current audit system.  
 
10.3 A review of the evidence 
In summary of the results thus far, numerous graphs and visual analyses of numerical 
changes in the data have revealed what appears to be a distinct disconnect between 
the municipal audit outcomes and service delivery scores. This is compounded by 
feedback from the survey of municipal officials, who were largely of the opinion that 
whilst the audit outcomes were reflective of financial compliance within an 
organisation and influenced the setting of service delivery targets, the audits 
themselves had very little influence over the achievement of these targets or actual 
operational performance.  
 
Furthermore, the Chi Squared and Cramer’s V tests conducted in chapter eight 
corroborate these findings, demonstrating evidence of a very weak relationship 
existing between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery scores. Finally, 
results from chapter nine and ten suggest that whilst the audits do sometimes reflect 




service delivery performance, factors such as financial and human resources have a 

































Chapter Eleven: The explanatory power of municipal audit outcomes – an analysis 
of key service delivery determinants using ordinary least squares regressions  
 
11.1 Empirical description  
Having thus far not found evidence of a strong relationship between the two variables 
of interest, this thesis now moves to examine the explanatory power of municipal 
audit outcomes with regards to municipal service delivery performance via an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Whilst the earlier, preliminary tests were of 
value – as was highlighted at the end of each test’s discussion, there were numerous 
potential weaknesses and flaws in the methodologies that rendered their results 
slightly questionable.  
 
Hence this paper will now move to test for a relationship between the two variables 
of interested via OLS regressions, as they are a more robust method of assessing 
correlation between variables than the previous methods applied in this thesis . The 
results will not only be more trustworthy but may also reveal new, different 
information – such as the direction of relationships between variables – that previous 
methods of testing for correlation were unable to uncover.  
 
OLS is an estimation technique that attempts to predict service delivery from the audit 
outcomes by fitting a regression line to the available data in such a manner that the 
estimates are as similar as possible to the observed data. The aim of the regression is 
to highlight important municipal characteristics that impact upon service delivery and 
in particular, to assess the explanatory power of municipal audits in relation to service 
delivery. This thesis will conduct two OLS regressions, one for each of the chosen 
years. The generic form of the OLS regression equation is as follows:  
 
Yit = Bot + B1xit1 + B2xit2 + ….. + BnXitn + uit   t = 2007, 2011  (1) 
 
Yit represents the dependent variable – in this case, service delivery performance – 
whilst xit1, xit2,… ..,xitn are the independent variables which are meant to capture the 




effect of municipal characteristics upon service delivery and explain the variation in 
Yit. Whilst Bot is the constant, intercept term, B1- Bn are the coefficients being estimated 
by the regression that explain each independent variable’s contribution towards 
explaining Yit. Finally, u it is the error term and this captures any unexplained variance 
in Y it not accounted for by the independent variables. The error term captures for 
example, measurement inaccuracy or omitted variables. The subscripts are used as 
identifiers, where i is used to signal specific variables and t represents the time period 
of the variable, either 2007 or 2011.   
 
 In light of the research question, the dependent variable reflects service delivery 
performance (as measured by the principal component scores) across municipalities 
whilst the main independent variable is the audit outcomes. The control or 
independent variables are attempting to isolate the impact of the audit outcomes upon 
service delivery by capturing characteristics that reflect a municipality’s operating 
environment and their ability to deliver public services.  
    
In terms of the factors influencing municipal service delivery, Managa (2012) 
highlighted institutional, financial, political and social resources. Furthermore, 
Kanyane (2013) contends that “the existence of a local municipality with poor service 
delivery is, amongst others, a direct consequence or manifestation of municipal 
capacity constraints, financial viability problems, service delivery protests, 
convoluted political processes, corruption and poor planning as well as monitoring 
and evaluation challenges.” This information, together with the output in table six to 
eight, influenced the selection of control variables, as explained in the next section.   
 
11.2 Dependent variable  
 
Service Delivery  
For both the 2007 and 2011 regression, the dependent variable takes the form of the 
service delivery principal components described in chapter nine. As described, these 




components provide each municipality with a service delivery score, based on a 
summation of the following variables:  
 Piped Water Inside Dwelling 
 Electricity for Cooking 
 Electricity for Lighting  
 Refuse Removed Weekly 
 Brick Dwellings  
As previously mentioned, because there is equal weighting placed on all five of the 
underlying variables, the dependent variable is called a ‘mixed’ component and can 
be interpreted as capturing a measure of overall service delivery levels within a 
municipality, with no specific focus on any one type of service. The interpretation is 
limited to showing how changes in control variables will impact the overall levels of 
access to services, whether it increases or decreases the level of services being 
delivered, but this impact cannot be further quantified in the same manner that 
regression coefficients are normally interpreted.  
 
11.3 Independent variables  
 
11.3.1 Key variable of interest: 
Audit Outcomes  
For both years, the municipal audit outcomes are included as independent variables 
and are the main focus of the regression. This data was taken from the 2007/2008 and 
2011/2012 annual reports of the South African’s Auditor-General. The audit outcome 
variable, as explained in chapter 8, is a categorical variable where five represents the 
best possible outcome (Clean Audit) and one represents the worst (Disclaimer). When 
included as a categorical variable in regressions, this variable is interpreted in relation 
to its base case, which is the worst audit outcome – Disclaimer.   
 
The purpose of municipal audits is to ensure financial compliance and adequate 
handling of public finances; thus stronger audit outcomes are expected to be linked to 
better performing municipalities, both in terms of financial management and service 




delivery. However, this is the exact assumption being tested in this thesis. The 
coefficient and significance of the audit outcomes variable will thus provide key 
information in relation to the research question.  
 
As per the hypotheses laid out, one of three possible findings are possible: the audit 
outcomes are positively related to the service delivery variable, are negatively related 
or have no relation at all.  
11.3.2 Municipal Financial Capacity Variables 
A significant factor determining the quantity and quality of services municipalities in 
South Africa are able to provide is the amount of revenue each collects. There are two 
main sources of municipal revenue in South Africa, that which is given to them by the 
state via inter-governmental transfers and the money that they collect themselves 
from property rates, service levies and fines. Using data from National Treasury, this 
thesis collected numerous proxy variables intended to capture the influence of 
financial resources upon service delivery.   
 
Municipal Revenue, Financial Ratios and Spending Indicators  
In terms of financial resources, of relevance is not only how much money the 
municipalities have to spend but the manner in which they spend and manage their 
finances. This thesis has three variables in this regard. Firstly, there is the absolute 
amount of operating revenue available to each municipality. Secondly, the National 
Treasury makes a host of financial ratios available, as indicators of the health of a 
municipality’s finances. These include ratios of the following:  
 
 Creditors to Operating Expenditure 
 Debtors to Service Charges  
 Infrastructure expenditure to Capital expenditure  
 Borrowing to Capital Revenue 
 Employee Costs to Own Revenue 
 Employee Costs to Operating Expenditure  
 Own Revenue to Operating Revenue  




 Borrowing to PPE 
 
Finally, as a proxy for the quality of municipal financial management, this thesis has 
the percentage of municipal income and expenditure over or underspent in relation 
to budgeted figures. It is expected that the larger amounts of revenue a municipality 
has, the healthier it’s ratios and the closer its actual expenditure is to its budget, the 
more services it can provide to its community.  
Distribution of Household Income, Household Goods and Unemployment levels  
As municipalities source the majority of their income from rates and service levies 
charged to the public, the levels of income in the municipal area will affect not only 
how much it can charge for its services but also the likelihood of individuals actually 
being able to pay their rates and fines. In addition, as is the case with the education 
variable, the levels of income in an area could also be an indication of how accountable 
the public will hold the municipality, to ensure it delivers adequate services. This 
thesis has collected three variables in this regard: the income brackets in a 
municipality, the unemployment rates and the level of household goods owned by 
families in a municipal area.  
 
With respect to levels of household income, this thesis used work by Visagie (2013) 
which determines the South African middle class to be households earning between 
R5 600 and R40 000 per month after tax. The lower and upper classes thus fit around 
these figures. However, as the data collected by Statistics South Africa does not match 
these exact income brackets, this thesis matched Visagie’s (2013) work as best as 
possible and defined the following variables:  
 
 Lower Class: No income to R4 800 
 Middle Class: R4 800 to R38 200  
 Upper Class: All income brackets above R38 200 a month  
 
These variables represent the percentage of each municipality’s population that falls 
into the respective categories. The wealth levels in an area are also linked to 




unemployment rates, variables for which have been included to represent the 
percentage of people in a municipality that are not in employment.  
 
11.3.3. Household Goods  
Furthermore, the amount of household goods the average family owns can be used as 
a proxy for affluence levels in a municipal area. To this end, a household asset index 
has been constructed using principal component analysis. The following variables 
have been included in the construction of the asset index:   
 
 Percentage of households with a cell phone 
 Percentage of households with internet access 
 Percentage of households with a radio 
 Percentage of households with a fridge  
 Percentage of households with a landline 
 Percentage of households with a television 
 Percentage of households with a computer  
 
It is expected that the wealthier a municipal area, the higher amount of disposable 
income which will increase demand for public services. (Mahabir, 2012) 
Consequently, municipalities in wealthier areas will be able to generate higher levels 
of own source revenue. As this is also likely to come with greater levels of public 
accountability, municipalities in wealthier areas of South Africa are expected to have 
better service delivery. 
 
It is expected that the higher the percentage of people classified as upper class in a 
municipality, the larger the amount of household goods own by the average family 
and the lower the unemployment rates in an area – the greater levels of wealth a 
municipality will be able to access. This, in turn, should increase the amount of 
services it can provide to its public.  
 
 




11.3.4 Municipal Political Landscape Variables 
Political Dominance  
The political economy and impact of political players upon municipal operations is an 
influence that must be taken into account when trying to explain service delivery 
performance. There is a prevailing theory in political economy literature that in areas 
with high levels of electoral competition, government officials often attempt to win 
votes through effective public service delivery (Kroth, 2014). Work by van Gass (2015) 
and Kroth (2014) explores the application of such theory to the South African context 
and produces mixed findings. Kroth (2014) highlights that, in pre-election years, larger 
equitable revenue shares are transferred to local municipalities that boast higher levels 
of voter support for the national party.  
 
van Gass (2015) finds supporting evidence for the dominant trajectory theory 
explained earlier, contending that there is a negative relationship between levels of 
electoral fractionalisation and service delivery in two particular African cities. His 
findings don’t hold though when contrasting different parts of those two locations, 
leaving the exact relationship slightly uncertain. Furthermore, politics can often have 
a negative effect upon service delivery with councillors voting along party lines, 
interfering with delivery operations and being appointed due to political connections 
as opposed to merit.  
  
To account for these effects, a political dominance variable was created to indicate the 
levels of political competition in a municipality. Using data sources from the South 
African Independent Electoral Commission, the categorical variable reflects zero if the 
majority party had less than 50% of votes in a municipality (base category), one if the 
party had more than 50% of the votes and two if the majority party had more than 
75% of the vote. There was a significant shift in terms of the number of municipalities 
where the majority had over 50% of the vote between 2007 and 2011, as displayed in 
table nine:  
  
 




Table 9:  Grouping of municipalities according to differences in distribution of political party 
votes for 2007 and 2011 
 2007  2011  
Less than 50% 
majority 
16 municipalities  5.86% 19 municipalities 6.96% 
Over 50% majority  109 municipalities 39.93% 139 municipalities 50.92% 
Over 75% majority  148 municipalities  54.21% 115 municipalities 42.12% 
 
The expected relationship between the political dominance variable and service 
delivery performance is unknown. Political dominance could lead to increased 
corruption activity in light of lower accountability levels, or it could lead to improved 
service delivery as the dominant party has less barriers to overcome from opposition 
parties. The dominant party may also improve performance in a bid to retain political 
control. Hence, the expected sign of the political variance is currently unknown and 
will be revealed through the regression analysis, depending on which political 
economy theory prevails.  
 
11.3.5 Municipal Community Demographic Variables  
The demographics of a municipality affect its service delivery, not only through 
population earning capacity and accountability levels, but also in terms of the type 




Given the legacy of apartheid and the high levels of poverty in South Africa, inequality 
is still split along population groups (Van den Berg & Louw, 2003). This means that 
the racial composition of a municipality’s constituency will impact upon its ability to 
delivery services, as Africans are more likely to be less wealthy than Whites. Race can 
thus be extended as a proxy not only for the wealth levels of an area but the type of 
infrastructure available.  
 




The spatial legacy of apartheid sees Black South Africans generally living in 
underdeveloped areas whilst the majority of White South Africans live in well -
established areas. The less infrastructure available, the harder it is for municipalities 
to deliver services such as electricity and piped water to dwellings. It is thus expected 
that levels of service delivery will be lower in areas with greater share of Black South 
Africans. The variable represents the percentage of each municipality’s population 
that is of the Black South African population group.  
 
Age 
The age profile of a municipality’s population is important because it reflects their 
earning capacity and gives an indication as to the type of services being required. For 
example, in a municipality with a large contingent of elderly people, there is likely to 
be lower levels of income as they are above the age of retirement, whilst there might 
also be a high demand for community health services. On the other hand, 
municipalities with a predominantly young population might be limited in its own-
source revenue generation as many of these youth will still be at school. Furthermore, 
municipalities with large proportions of both elderly and young people together with 
fewer working aged adults is reflective of the profiles of poorer areas, particularly 
those situated in rural regions.  
 
The age variables included in the regression split into three categories: the percentage 
of people aged 0 to 15 years (young), the percentage aged 16 to 65 years (working) and 
the percentage of those aged 66 years and above (elderly). It is expected that the larger 
the percentage of a municipality’s population falling into the working class, the more 
own-source revenue a municipality can generate and thus it can provide a greater 
level of public services.  
 
Education 
The average education levels in a municipality are expected to influence municipal 
operations in two possible ways. Firstly, it is likely that municipal staff will be drawn 
from the skills pool in its area, thus the more educated its population the higher the 




likelihood of it having skilled individuals as employees. Secondly, and most 
importantly, education levels are positively related to income levels (Mincer, 1974). 
The higher an individual’s education, the more money they are able to earn, feeding 
back once more into a municipality’s source of own revenue through rates collections. 
It is thus expected that the more people with post-secondary schooling education 
levels in a municipality, the wealthier that area and the more services a municipality 
will deliver. 
 
Education was split into four different categories, representing the percentage of 
people in each municipality with no schooling, primary school, secondary school and 
tertiary school.   
 
Number of People  
Another fairly obvious factor influencing municipal service delivery is the number of 
people in each municipal area. The more there are, the higher the population density 
and the greater level of services demanded (Mahabir, 2012). One can easily imagine 
the difference in service delivery demand place on an urban metropoli tan 
municipality in comparison to that required of a rural, local municipality.  
 
This has been captured via a variable that represents the percentage of population 
residing in each municipal area.   
 
Homeland status  
Due to the passing of the Black Homeland Citizenship Act 26 of 1970 and the National 
States Citizenship Act of 1970, during Apartheid all Black South Africans were 
stripped of their nationality, required to relocate and reside in one of the ten self-
governing territories (Noble & Wright, 2013). These territories were known as 
‘homelands’ and were intended to each be home to a different ethnic group.  
 
The historical lack of investment into these areas and prevalence of poverty amongst 
their residents has left a legacy that prevails until more recent times and long after the 




homelands were abolished. Noble and Wright (2013) find that “the areas in South 
Africa with the highest levels of deprivation [are] mainly to be found in rural former 
homeland Areas,” and that across “the domains of income, employment, education, 
and living environment, former homelands are more deprived on average than ‘the 
rest of South Africa.’ 
 
Hence, if a municipality is situated in an area that was previously a homeland or part 
thereof, they will have a very different set of circumstances in which to deliver services 
than one situated in an area that was previously part of the republic of South Africa.  
For example, prior homeland areas are more likely to be rural areas with poor 
infrastructure. It is expected that a municipality situated in a region that was 
previously part of a republic will have stronger levels of service delivery.  
 
The homeland variable in this thesis is a categorical variable that is coded one if the 
municipality was previously part of a homeland, two if it was previously part of both 
a homeland and the republic, and a three if it was previously part of the republic.  
 
Gender  
Numerous studies highlight the “feminisation of poverty,” which refers to the 
phenomenon of poverty adversely affecting females, with women often being up to 
30% poorer than men (Rogan, 2014; Pheko, 2011). The 2014 tax statistics produced by 
the South African Revenue Services further show that, on average, females earn 
amounts that are 33% lower than male salaries (South African Revenue Services, 
2014:9; Grant, 2015). Thus, as the predominant gender in poor areas is female, a 
municipality that has more women and female-headed households in its region is 
likely to have less own-source revenue than those with more male residents. Service 
delivery is therefore likely to be weaker in these regions.  
 
The gender variable in this thesis represents the percentage of females residing in each 
municipality.   
 




11.4 OLS Regression Results  
From the outlined list of variables, the dependent variable used in the OLS regressions 
are the service delivery principal components from 2007 and 2011, whilst the main 
independent variable of interest is the audit outcomes. The service delivery principal 
component represents overall levels of service delivery in each municipality, with all 
five indicators of service delivery being equally weighted. A regression was 
constructed for each year at a national level, incorporating all South Africa 
municipalities apart from those that were classified as outliers. A combination of the 
control variables that maximised the explanatory power of the model was retained.3 
Test results of the OLS assumptions have been included in table thirteen of the 
appendix. The regression results are displayed in table ten.  
 
Table 10: OLS regression output for 2007 and 2011 4 
Independent Variables5 Dependent Variable: Service Delivery Levels 
(PCA)6  
 2011 2007 
MAIN VARIABLE OF INTEREST: 









Unqualified with Findings -0.0980 -0.1406 
                                                 
3 Variables that were excluded due to high variance inflation factors are listed in table two of 
the appendix.  
4 The summary statistics for all variables included in the regression, as well as comments on 
the results from OLS assumption tests, can be found in part two of the appendix.  
5 It should be noted that, as many of these variables are representing percentages and are not 
categorical variables, those expected to be negatively related to the dependent variable can 
either have a negative sign or a smaller impact on service delivery than its counterparts e.g. 
the coefficient upon % Lower-class should either be negative or smaller than %Middle and 
%Upper-class. 
6 The formation of these principal component scores are outlined in Chapter 9 and the 
individual municipal scores can be found in tables eight to eleven in the appendix.  









MUNICIPAL FINANCE CONTROLS 






























Capital Revenue Transfer Subsidy to  








Borrowing to PPE  0.0000 
(0.0002) 
 






Debtors to Service Charges -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
 
















% Farm Areas 0.0089** 
(0.0043) 
 




% Middleclass  0.0036 
(0.0173) 
% Upper-class  0.0291 
(0.0331) 








Political Dominance (Base Category: Majority Party < 50% votes)  












% Youth  -0.0148*** 
(0.0198) 




% No Schooling -0.0264* 0.0324* 





% Primary Education  -0.0751*** 
(0.0127) 
% Secondary Education  0.0158** 
(0.0076) 
 








Homeland Status (Base Category: Previous Homeland)  


















Number of Observations 171 266 
R-Squared 0.8573 0.6177 
Note:  Standard Errors are in Brackets; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
 
Table ten‘s regressions display an interesting assortment of results that are, in some 
cases, contrary to what would have been expected or to the trends that have thus far 
been highlighted. Although there are certain issues that affect the robustness of these 
results, these OLS regressions do offer some useful, preliminary insights into the 
relationship between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery performance. In 
this regard, all the audit outcomes are insignificant in both 2007 and 2011, once more 
indicating their weak correlation to service delivery performance in South African 
local government and reinforcing the findings of this thesis thus far.  





On the whole, most of the significant coefficients are all very tiny, rendering their 
impact upon the service delivery score negligible. This is particularly true for the 
municipal financial control variables. A scattering of these variables are positively or 
negatively significant at a probability level of p <0.05 or p < 0.01. However, not one of 
these variables are greater than 0.01 – effectively negating their correlation with the 
service delivery principal component dependent variable. This may be initial evidence 
that the overall levels of municipal revenue (highlighted as being significant in the 
previous chapter) might be more influential on municipal service delivery capacity 
than the way in which costs and incomes relate to one another.  
 
Turning to the results of the socio-economic controls – whilst unemployment rates 
and percentage of female residents are insignificant, the percentage of farming areas 
and lower income class earners are both significant in 2011.  Furthermore, the race, 
age and education variables are all significant for both 2007 and 2011. Unexpectedly, 
many the signs on these significant variables are opposite in 2007 to 2011, making their 
interpretation difficult. For example, whilst the percentage of elderly and uneducated 
citizens are negatively related to service delivery scores in 2011, as would be expected; 
in 2007 these variables are positively related to the dependent variable. Whilst there 
is no obvious reason for these changes in the signs, movements in the significant 
variables will effectively have no impact upon municipal service delivery 
performance due to their very small coefficients.  
 
In contrast, the Household Goods asset index is significant in both 2007 and 2011 at a 
probability level of p < 0.01, with the 2011 result being the largest, positive coefficient 
out of all included variables. Whilst slightly smaller, the 2007 variable is also positive 
and significant. As the household goods asset can be used as a proxy for household 
wealth levels in a municipality – with more goods owned by an average household 
indicating higher wealth levels – these results indicate that municipal service delivery 
appears to be positively associated with wealth levels amongst its constituents, more 
so than with the audit outcomes.  





Another interesting result pertains to the Homeland variable, which provides an 
indication of not only how much investment was made into an area’s infrastructure, 
but can be used as an indication of its average wealth, education and urbanisation 
levels. In 2011, both the Previous Partial Homeland/Republic variable as well as the 
Previous Republic variable are significant at a probability level of p < 0.05 whilst in 
2007, the Previous Republic variable is significant at a probability level of p < 0.10. 
Both have sizeable coefficients, particularly in comparison to the other results. These 
should be interpreted in relation to the base case variable, Previous Homeland, and it 
would be expected that, as in 2007, if a municipality is part of an area previously 
deemed a ‘Republic,’ it should have better quality and levels of infrastructure, leading 
to greater service delivery performance. However, in 2011, tentative evidence suggests 
that, in comparison to areas that were previously part of a Homeland, those that were 
either partially part of a Republic or fully part of a previous republic have lower levels 
of service delivery.  Further research would need to be done to verify these results and 
uncover the reasons behind these apparent changes.  
 
Finally, the regression output suggests that in 2011, the prevailing political economy 
theory is one in which political dominance allows a municipality to forge ahead with 
service delivery, unencumbered by objections from opposition parties.  The regression 
suggests that in municipalities where the ruling political party holds more than 75% 
of the voter support, such support positively increases service delivery scores – 
significant at a probability level of p < 0.05.   
 
In summary, while the OLS results suggest no significant relationships between 
municipal audit outcomes and service delivery performance, various socio-economic 
and financial variables do appear to be significantly related to the dependent variable, 
albeit with very small effect sizes. Of interest is the relatively large, positive coefficient 
on the Household Goods variable, suggesting strong relations between regional 
wealth levels and service delivery, as well as the significant Homeland and Majority 




Political Party variables. Wealth, political influence and operational context thus seem 
to have a greater impact upon service delivery than municipal audit outcomes.  
 
11.5 Presence of Endogeneity and Model Misspecification  
Unfortunately, as mentioned in chapter seven, there are a host of factors influencing 
municipal service delivery for which comprehensive data was not available or easily 
accessible. These include variables such as capturing the capacity of municipal staff – 
particularly their qualifications and work experience, the extent of corruption and 
number of service delivery protests taking place in a municipality, the amount each 
receives in intergovernmental transfers, per capita expenditure and the levels of 
public participation in municipal operations.  
 
These may render the results of this thesis slightly biased, as the effect of the included 
variables may be overestimated due to important variables not being included in the 
regression. To try account for this, the data was manipulated from a wide dataset to a 
long panel, upon which fixed effects regressions were run. Chapter twelve elaborates 




















Chapter Twelve: Accounting for time invariant factors affecting the relationship 
between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery via fixed effects 
regressions 
 
As outlined in chapter eleven, the omission of numerous, potentially influential 
variables from the OLS regressions in table twelve may bias the results. However, this 
thesis benefits from the fact that it’s data can be organised into a panel dataset, which 
allows for two sources of variation to be examined: the variation occurring as a result 
of differences between observations and that which is a result of differences within 
observations across time.  
 
In other words, a panel dataset will allow for the variation in service delivery 
performance to be broken down into two parts – the service delivery variation that is 
due to differences between municipalities and the variation that stems from 
differences within municipalities during the time period 2007 to 2011. This thesis is 
specifically interested in the within variation, to understand whether differences in 
audit outcomes overtime within a municipality are correlated with changes in service 
delivery performance in the same organisation. 
 
Fixed effects regressions are suitable empirical techniques to be used with panel 
datasets as they account for any unobserved, time-invariant variables and isolate on 
those effects that change across the years. Fixed effects regressions thus allow for a 
more robust assessment of the relationship between service delivery levels and 
municipal audit outcomes, accounting for the unobserved variables omitted from the 
OLS regressions in table twelve.  
 
It should be noted that fixed effects regressions are only suitable in data with 
significant amounts of within-group variance. Should few changes take place within 
a municipality between 2007 and 2011, the regressions will not return useful results. 
This is not a problem for this thesis as the main focus is analysing the relationship 
between the municipal audit outcomes and service delivery performance, both of 




which variables changed between 2007 and 2011.  Furthermore, the majority of any 
significant time-invariant variables should have been captured in the OLS regression 
output in table twelve.  
 
12.1 What does a fixed effects regression do?  
A fixed effects regression captures the variation within observations across time, by 
examining the relationship between the dependent and independent variables for 
each observation and controlling for any unobserved, correlated effects.  It does this 
by de-meaning the data to isolate the within-subject variation. As this dataset only 
covers two periods of time, the de-meaning effect is the same as if the data had been 
differenced. As they were present in both periods, de-meaning or differencing 
excludes any uncaptured, constant effects from the analysis, such as municipal staff 
capacity or levels of public accountability. A fixed or random effects regression thus 
focuses solely on time-variant factors, such as the audit outcomes, and it further 
assumes that any excluded effects are correlated with the included independent 
variables. 
 
12.2 Empirical Description: Fixed versus Random Effects Regressions  
An alternative to a fixed effects regression is a random effects regression, and before 
any analysis is run – the appropriate empirical technique must be determined. 
Consider the following regression:  
  
                                  Yit = Bo + BnXitn  + uit                 t = 2007, 2011   (2) 
where  
        uit = αit + ηit          (3)   
ηit is the normal un-observed, random error term produced in OLS regressions 
(assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables). However, αit is known 
as an individual specific effect and captures the unobserved, time-invariant effects for 
each municipality. The difference between a fixed effects and random effects 
regression is whether or not αit is allowed to be correlated with the independent 




variables. Whilst the random effects regression does not allow for any correlation, the 
fixed effects regression does not require αit to be uncorrelated with the Xitn.     
 
To determine which of the two types of regressions is most appropriate, if any, a series 
of tests was run. This is important to rule out the possibility that alternative methods 
aren’t more suitable forms of analysis than fixed effects. As shown in table thirteen 
and fourteen in the appendix, the various tests demonstrate that fixed or random 
effects regressions are better suited to the data than alternative empirical techniques, 
such as Pooled OLS.  
 
To decide between a random or fixed effects regression, a Hausman test was run, 
which rejected the null hypothesis that a random effects regression is the more 
appropriate empirical tool out of the two. The test output is in table fifteen of the 
appendix. Thus, a fixed effects regression is best suited to the current dataset and the 
other assumptions tested in relation to these regressions are included in the appendix.  
 
12.3 Interpretation of the dependent service delivery variable   
Although a fixed effects regression will provide important information as to how each 
included control variable contributes to the prediction of the dependent service 
delivery component – the nature of the principal component renders interpretation of 
the beta coefficients produced by the regression difficult to interpret. This is because 
the principal component, whilst representing overall service delivery levels in each 
municipality, has no exact meaning in itself.  
 
To ascribe meaning, the weightings placed upon each underlying variable in the 
principal component analysis must be considered. As previously mentioned, because 
there is equal weighting placed on all five of the underlying variables, the dependent 
variable is called a ‘mixed’ component. It can be interpreted as capturing a measure 
of overall service delivery levels within a municipality, with no specific focus on any 
one type of service. Thus, the interpretation is limited to showing how changes  in 
control variables will impact the overall levels of access to services, whether it 




increases or decreases the level of services being delivered, but this impact cannot be 
further quantified in the same manner that regression coefficients are normally 
interpreted.  
 
12.4 Data Description  
The same data used for the OLS regressions was applied here again, except it was 
transformed from a wide dataset to long, whereby each variable has two values for 
each observation, one for 2007 and one for 2011. This allows for the differencing to 
take place. It is a strongly balanced dataset, meaning that there are no missing values 
and each municipality has the same number of observations. The variables available 
for inclusion in this regression follow the same logic outlined earlier.  
 
12.5 Results of Fixed Effects Regression with Robust, Clustered Standard Errors   
Following on from the information already outlined and using the OLS regressions as 
a guide, the following output was produced from a fixed effects regression with 
clustered, robust standard errors assessing the impact of time-variant changes upon 
municipal service delivery. Whilst initially conducted at a national level, the 
regression was repeated several times to assess whether the same results were 





































































































































































































Majority Party  
< 50% votes) 
    


























































































































































445 193 102 384 
Number of Groups  245 106 57 209 
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.0978 -0.7146 -0.9346 -0.4104 




Rho 0.7685 0.8477 0.9748 0.8321 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note:  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
 
Table eleven’s output displays a host of results that are not only quite different from 
the output produced by the OLS regressions, but do not display many cohesive trends. 
Few variables are significant across all four levels of analysis and for the vast majority, 
the coefficient sizes are very small, if not negligible. This could indicate that there are 
other influences impacting upon service delivery that are not being captured by the 
variables in these regressions.  It also highlights that there is a large variation in the 
working conditions of different types of local municipalities, rendering it hard to find 
conclusive results across them all.  
 
With regards to the audit outcomes, whilst the results for the National Regression 
mirror those in table ten’s OLS results - when focusing in on different groupings of 
municipalities the Clean Audit outcome becomes positively significant for both local 
municipalities and those classed as B3 entities. Furthermore, the Unqualified with No 
Findings variable is also positively significant for Local Municipalities and for those 
classified as B4 municipalities, achieving an Adverse audit outcome will negatively 
impact upon service delivery in relation to achieving a Disclaimer. Although not 
ubiquitous, these results suggest that the top echelons of the audit system do appear 
have a positive impact upon municipal operations of certain entities which should, in 
turn, improve service delivery performance.   
 
However, when compared with the percentage of residents living in an area, the 
variable for which is significant for rural municipalities classed as B4, it is clear that 
the effects of the audit outcome variables are negligible. The coefficients produced for 
the population density variable indicate that the percentage of the overall population 
residing in a municipal area has a significant and sizeable negative effect on the levels 
of service delivery. In other words, the more people living in one area, the greater 




demand for public services and the poorer the service delivery performance of 
municipalities, at both a national and local level. This is typical of over populated, 
poorer regions.  
 
However, the effects of levels of demand for public services upon municipal 
operations cannot be looked at in isolation. If high levels of demand are accompanied 
by high amounts of disposable income – as occurs in wealthier areas of South Africa 
– the end result could be improved municipal service delivery performance. Higher 
disposable income enables citizens to demand more and better quality amenities, as 
well as reliably service their rates accounts (Mahabir, 2012). Thus, it is not surprising 
that the % People variable is significant for B4 municipalities, as these rural entities 
are often underfinanced, lacking in staff and would struggle to deal with high levels 
of population density and demand for public services. The regressions include 
numerous variables acting as proxies for regional wealth levels and their coefficients 
are expected to demonstrate this income effect upon municipal performance.  
 
For example, as with the OLS regressions, the level of household goods owned in a 
region is a proxy for wealth levels of a municipality’s residents. They are also a 
significant determinant of demand for public services, as electronic items need 
electricity and water to function. Furthermore, it is likely that residents who can afford 
multiple household goods live in more formal housing structures than those living in 
dwellings such as shacks. As was earlier stated, greater percentages of formal 
dwellings in an area are expected to be positively correlated with delivery as it is easier 
for municipalities to service such structures. Thus, it makes sense that the Household 
Goods variable is significant and positive at a probability level of p < 0.01 for all four 
regressions, notwithstanding their relatively small coefficient size.  
 
Another proxy for area wealth levels are the education variables. In light of the 
distorted returns to schooling in South Africa increasing disposable income levels 
(Keswell & Poswell, 2004), one would expect the education variables to be positively 
correlated with the service delivery dependent variable. This is indeed the case with 




the secondary education variable, which is positive and significant for the nationally 
representative regression. Furthermore, the No Schooling variable is significantly 
negative for B3 municipalities whilst the Primary Education variable is significant 
across all four regressions, and negative for three of the four.  
 
This is to be expected, given that the returns to education in South Africa become 
exponential from secondary schooling onwards, with lower forms of education being 
highly correlated to unemployment and poverty (Keswell & Poswell, 2004). The 
tertiary education variable is unexpectedly negative for the B4 Municipal Class. The 
insignificance of the variable across the other regressions suggest that the link between 
higher levels of education, greater income and more sources of own municipal 
revenue generation might not be that strong – indeed it appears to be operating in 
reverse in rural areas, where one would not expect there to be a high percentage of 
tertiary educated residents. Residential education levels are thus perhaps not the 
strongest driver of demand and payment for public services, with limited influence 
over municipal operations.  
 
The age and income class variables also produced results that are counterintuitive.  
The age variables provide insight as to the type of demand placed upon 
municipalities, as elderly and youthful residents are often associated with lower levels 
of income and rates payment capacity, greater reliance upon government subsidies 
and higher levels of demand for free public services. The income variables are a direct 
measure of a region’s wealth levels, and the higher percentage of residents that are 
classed as lower income class earners, the poorer service delivery in such areas is 
expected to be.  
 
The results show varying support for these theory. It holds at a national level, as the 
lower income class variable is significant and negative in the nationally representative 
regression. However, the variable is positively significant for the local and B3 
municipalities. In addition, the percentage of Upper Income residents variable is 
significantly negative, although small, for B3 municipalities whilst the percentage of 




young and elderly citizens are both positive and significant for regressions two, three 
and four. 
 
A possible explanation for this could be that many of the people falling into lower 
income brackets are likely to be reliant upon state grants and unable to pay rates. 
Likewise, with youth or elderly people, neither of which are typically significant 
income earners. Hence, the potential for municipalities with high proportions of 
young, old or poor residents to raise their own revenue is limited, resulting in them 
receiving higher intergovernmental financial transfers than wealthier entities (Section 
214 (2), South African Constitution; National Treasury, 2011).  Hence, for certain 
municipalities, having poorer citizens might actually assist with their service delivery 
capacity.  
 
As South Africa’s income inequality is so sharply split along racial lines (Mahabir, 
2012), the racial variables convey wealth information too however, interestingly, none 
of these were significant in the regression output. Inequality is also highly linked with 
gender in South Africa (Rogan, 2014; Magongo, 2016), and one would expect to see a 
negative coefficient upon a significant Percentage of Female Headed Households as 
the more prevalent they are, the poorer a region is expected to be. The results however 
returned a positive result.  
 
Lastly, various municipal financial variables are significant, indicating that financial 
governance is a relevant aspect influencing service delivery performance. However, 
the varying results across the four regressions and opposing signs render the results  
difficult to interpret in terms of understanding the directional impact of each 
indicator, although their small coefficients suggest it is limited either way.  
 
From these results, it thus appears that the null hypothesis of audit outcomes being 
positively related to service delivery cannot be rejected, as the municipal audit 
outcomes, particularly the Clean audit outcome, do appear to be significant.  
However, their impact on or relation to service delivery is not as strong as factors such 




as the levels of demand for public services and the ability of residents to pay for 
services. This may suggest that whilst a clean audit outcome is a worthwhile goal for 
municipalities to pursue, their ability to deliver public services is more a function of 
income and socio-economic factors than administrative capacity, and simply having 
robust financial management is not enough to ensure effective public service delivery 
in a constrained financial environment.  
 
This thesis will now examine whether the same outcomes are produced when the 
regressions are run in different provincial locations. The provinces are grouped 
according to proximity (regression 2 and 3) as well as historical audit outcomes – 
regression 1 grouped the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal as these provinces 
traditionally score the weakest audit results whilst the two metros, the Western Cape 























Table 12: Results from Fixed Effects Regressions across Provincial Groupings  
Independent 
Variables 
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166 110 93 76 
Number of Groups  92 63 50 40 
corr (u_i, Xb) -0.5663 -0.9861 -0.9572 -0.9713 




Rho 0.8044 0.9895 0.9713 0.9869 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Omitted 
 
Note:  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
 
Table twelve’s output allows for the analysis of the results across geographic locations 
to determine whether the impact of the audit outcomes and socio-economic variables 
differ depending on where the municipalities are situated. It appears, given the 
inconsistent spread of significant variables, that very few trends are applicable across 
the entire country.  
 
With regards to the audit outcome variables, the Unqualified with Findings and Clean 
audit outcomes are positive and significant for both regression one – the Eastern Cape 
and KwaZulu-Natal – and regression four – the Western Cape and Gauteng. No 
significant audit results were produced for regressions three and four. Interestingly 
the significant results occurred in regions that typically achieve the weakest 
(regression one) and strongest (regression four) audit outcomes. As KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Eastern Cape are home to some of the poorest municipalities in South Africa  
and Western Cape and Gauteng some of the wealthiest (BusinessTech.co.za, 2016a), 
these results reinforce the link between regional income levels and audit outcomes. 
The effectiveness of the municipal audit system thus appears to differ depending on 
an entity’s location.  
 
With reference to municipal financial controls, a host of different variables are 
significant across the four regressions – often with contrasting signs, indicating that 
financial management does not have ubiquitous application across South Africa.  
However the sizes of the coefficients are so small that their impact upon service 
delivery is in effect negligible. Two interesting exceptions to note are the variables 
capturing the percentage by which municipalities exceeded their budgeted 
expenditure or budgeted income. Both significant and greater than zero for the 
Western Cape and Gauteng, exceeding budgeted expenditure seems to have a 




negative impact upon service delivery whilst exceeding budgeted income is positively 
related to the dependent variable.  
 
The opposite signs on the significant Political Dominance variables in regression two 
and three indicate that the prevailing economic theory is dependent upon which 
region of the country is being examined. Whereas political dominance has a positive 
impact upon service delivery in Limpopo, North West & Mpumalanga, in the Free 
State and Northen Cape, political dominance is negatively related to service delivery. 
This once more highlights that municipalities across the provinces operate in very 
different contexts, with few trends holding across the entire country.  
 
The variation in trends is also relevant to the Household Goods variable, which have 
up until table twelve been positive and significant for all regressions. Table twelve 
though reveals that the impact of regional wealth levels, as proxied by the percentage 
of household goods owned, are only significant in the regions captured by regressions 
two and three.  There is no clear reason why the proxy would not be significant for 
regressions one and four too, as the audit outcome variable indicates that a wealth 
effect is at play. There are perhaps other financial factors in these areas that are more 
significantly related to the dependent variable but which have not been included in 
these regressions. 
 
Another interesting trend to note is that the primary education variable is significant 
and negatively related to service delivery for all but regression four. This is in line 
with the extorted returns to South Africa education theory outlined earlier (Keswell & 
Poswell, 2004) and demonstrates that primary education is a factor that, for the most 
part, has the same effect upon municipal performance across the country. Although 
significant, the positive secondary education variable has a near zero coefficient and 
the significant tertiary education variable shows a negative relationship with service 
delivery. This unusual trend has presented itself in a few of the results outlined earlier, 
suggesting that tertiary education has a different dynamic with service delivery in 




rural areas to what is expected. Further research could be done to explain and verify 
this particular result.  
 
Furthermore, the percentage of female residents is significant for the second 
regression and negative. This is to be expected, as the average female South African is 
up to 30% poorer than her male counterpart thus in areas with high numbers of 
women citizens, the municipalities are likely to collect lower rates income and deliver 
fewer services (Rogan, 2014). Limpopo, North West and Mpumalanga are typically 
resource constrained provinces, providing further support for this theory.  
 
Finally, the population density variable is significant for all but regression one, and 
demonstrates once more that socio-economic factors do not necessarily impact upon 
municipal operations in the same way across different locations. Whilst the number 
of people in an area are positively related to service delivery in regressions two and 
four, it is negatively related in regression three. Still one of the largest variables out of 
all the results, this variable appears to interact with regional wealth levels and other 
socio-economic factors and can’t be looked at in insolation.  
 
12.6 The Relation between Municipal Audit Outcomes and Service Delivery  
 
The results presented in tables ten to twelve highlight numerous important trends. 
Firstly, and most important for this thesis’ hypothesis, is the audit outcomes variables. 
It does appear that in some local municipalities, particularly those in KwaZulu-Natal, 
Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng - a Clean Audit outcome is associated with 
higher levels of service delivery in comparison to a Disclaimer. However, this was not 
a very prevalent trend and when compared with the coefficient size of other 
significant variables, it becomes clear that the impact of the audit outcomes upon 
service delivery is quite small.  
 
Secondly, it is clear that very few variables are significant across municipal types, 
classes and locations. Even the Household Goods variable which proxied regional 
wealth levels – a consistently positive and significant variable for all of the regressions 




in table ten and eleven – became insignificant when examined across provinces. Other 
variables, such as the percentage of people living in a municipal area, interact with 
associated socio-economic factors which also means that their impact upon service 
delivery differs from location to location. Thus, there is a vast amount of variability 
within the municipal operating system  
 
From these results, it thus appears that the null hypothesis of audit outcomes being 
positively related to service delivery cannot be rejected, as the municipal audit 
outcomes, particularly the Clean audit outcome, do appear to be significant.  
However, their impact on or relation to service delivery is not as strong as factors such 
as the levels of demand for public services and the ability of residents to pay for 
services. This may suggest that whilst a clean audit outcome is a worthwhile goal for 
municipalities to pursue, their ability to deliver public services is more a function of 
income and socio-economic factors than administrative capacity, and simply having 
robust financial management is not enough to ensure effective public service delivery 




















Chapter Thirteen: Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has found evidence to suggest that a positive but weak 
relationship exists between municipal audit outcomes and service delivery 
performance only in some cases, rendering financial compliance limited in terms of its 
impact on municipal operations. Ledger (2016) agrees with this statement, contending 
that “adopting the audit outcome as some kind of proxy for municipal efficiency” is a 
“very serious error” and that the relationship between municipal financial 
governance, audit outcomes and service delivery “is not simply causal.” Ledger (2016) 
has further found that “a good audit outcome often suggests that municipality in 
question has thrown considerable resources at the problem. 
 
Municipal financial audits ensure transparency and prevent corruption. They assist 
local governments to set performance targets and account for actions taken towards 
fulfilling them. However, the audits have very little impact upon an entity’s ability to 
actually achieve their goals. Whilst a clean audit outcome is a worthwhile goal for 
municipalities to pursue, their ability to deliver public services is more a function of 
financial and socio-economic factors than administrative capacity or regulation 
compliance. These performance determining factors include the wealth levels of 
municipal residents, the extent of urbanisation or sophistication of available 
infrastructure and the amount of demand for public goods. 
 
Thus, good financial governance does not appear to be sufficient to assist 
municipalities that are struggling to perform their legislated duties. There are 
consequently grounds to contend that the amount of emphasis placed upon financial 
compliance in South African legislation and by the Auditor-General might not be the 
most helpful approach in terms of improving municipal performance, as the existing 
auditing framework appears to produce limited benefits that spill over into other 
areas of municipal operations.  
 




Indeed, whilst South Africa’s municipal auditing framework is part of a plethora of 
compliance regulations intended to keep decentralised power in check, from the 
findings of this thesis it can be said that these regulations have failed to achieve their 
over-arching goal of encouraging strong municipal operations. The regulations 
appear to be disconnected from municipal operational performance. This is likely less 
a reflection of a failed system of decentralisation and more of a need for the audit 
system itself to be adjusted so that there is a stronger correlation between the two 
outcomes.  
 
An obvious flaw in the design of the auditing system is that the regulations have not 
been adequately contextualised to South Africa’s local government sphere . The fact 
that few variables were significant across all the different municipal groupings 
highlights just how diverse the operational contexts of municipalities across South 
Africa can be. In light of this, the country’s one-size-fits-all auditing regulations seem 
incongruous. The capacity of a metropolitan municipality differs vastly from a rural 
local municipality, yet they are required to meet the same onerous auditing criteria. A 
tiered or differentiated auditing system should be developed to account for such 
differences, and the exorbitant costs of the audits to local municipalities – often 
involving high consultant fees – should also be addressed.  
 
Furthermore, the public auditing regulations need to move away from being 
compliance focused towards more value based auditing methods that look beyond 
tick boxes and examine the underlying, structural issues affecting municipal 
operational performance. As Zille (2015) contends, the auditing system needs to 
become more ‘nuanced,’ geared towards “‘value for money’ auditing, which 
determines whether the choices made provide the best value for public money in the 
given circumstances.’   
 
To achieve this, the municipal auditing system needs to be more effective in holding 
municipal managers and staff accountable for their actions without hemming them in 
or not allowing for the use of their initiative. According to the World Development            




Report (WDR) of 2004, ‘failures in service delivery are squarely failures in 
accountability relationships’ (Mundial, 2004; Joshi, 2013). Currently, South African 
municipal employees face negative performance incentives, resulting from the focus 
upon compliance and penalisation for not achieving ambitious service delivery 
objectives.  
 
As emphasised by Joshi (2013), transparency and accountability mechanisms like the 
public sector audits do not account for the “the underlying political context that really 
governs the incentives different actors have to act on the demand for good 
governance" and have not explored "the extent to which information or accountability 
is likely to make a difference. “The audit regulations need to be adjusted so that staff 
take full accountability and are motivated to perform to the best of their abilities.  
 
Two suggestions for adaption include introducing penalisations for poor municipal 
and employee performance (there is currently very little in this regard) and perhaps 
introducing more community-based accountability mechanisms whereby the local 
residents hold their public servants responsible. Social audits and public hearings, 
which have been experimented with in India and produced very positive results, 
could be included in South African regulations (Joshi, 2013).  
 
Adding to the current work burden of municipal employees is the fact that local 
governments have been handed responsibilities without being sufficiently equipped 
to perform them, particularly in terms of limited finances. As Joshi (2013) argues 
“accountability and transparency initiatives without corresponding support for 
increasing the capacity to respond can lead to inaction and frustration on the part of 
providers” (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).  
 
In a recent report by PARI (2016) examining the regulation difficulties experienced by 
60 of the worst performing municipalities in the 2013/2014 audit outcomes, a host of 
common operational issues were found across the following categories: leadership, 
governance and oversight, basic administration, capacity, inter-governmental support 




and audit specific issues. Many of these are never addressed sufficiently by the 
auditing process as they required deeper, structural interventions and are too often 
chalked up to leadership failures “rather than a more nuanced approach that takes 
sufficient cognition of the importance of building robust and sustainable institutions” 
(Ledger, 2016). As the report contends, effective administration is a structural issue 
from which the audit outcomes flow and “there needs to be a greater focus on the 
operational efficiency and effectiveness of all municipalities, rather than simply 
focusing getting all municipalities to achieve a clean audit” (PARI, 2016; Ledger, 2016) 
 
Hence, this thesis concludes that South Africa’s municipal audit system is a flawed 
regulation in the country’s decentralised governance model and one that is failing to 
achieve its objectives of improving municipal performance. Besides not being 
adequately contextualised or supported, the auditing regulations fail to strike an 
effective balance between complexity and simplicity, rendering them unable to keep 
decentralised power in check without unnecessarily restraining municipal employees  
or focusing on superficial governance issues. Further research should be conducted 
into how this balance can be achieved and adaptations made to the current regulations 
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1. Tables  
Table 1: Changes to Municipal Codes 
Mun Code Action Taken Reason 
Altered Municipal Codes 
EC125 Changed to BUF EC125 changed from a local 
municipality to the 
metropolitan municipality, 
Buffalo City in 2011. 
FS172 Changed to MAN FS172 changed from a local 
municipality to the 
metropolitan municipality, 
Mangaung in 2011.  
EC151 Changed to EC443 The code of this municipality 
was changed between 2007 
and 2011.  
EC152 Changed to EC444 The code of this municipality 
was changed between 2007 
and 2011. 
FS171 Changed to FS164 The code of this municipality 
was changed between 2007 
and 2011. 
FS173 Changed to FS196 The code of this municipality 
was changed between 2007 
and 2011. 
DC20/FS196 Changed to DC20 This municipality had a name 
change and become a district 
municipality.  
Absorbed Municipal Areas 
NW391  Dropped from dataset 




NW395 These two municipalities 
were separate in 2007 but 
then merged together to form 
a new municipality, NW397, 
in 2011. All three were 
dropped.  
NW397 
NW405 Dropped from dataset This municipality was 
absorbed into two other 
municipal areas, NW401 and 
NW402. 
DC46 Dropped from dataset These municipalities were all 





GT484 Dropped from dataset In 2007, this municipality was 
a part of the North West 
Province but in 2011, it was 
back in the Gauteng 
Province.  
DC17 Dropped from dataset In 2011, this municipality was 
incorporated into Mangaung. 
 
Table 2: Variables excluded due to high VIF values 
2007 2011 
% Black % Black 
% Coloured % Coloured 
% Indian % Indian 
% working aged % Working Aged 
Total Number of Staff Total Number of Staff 
% Middle Class % Middle Class 




 % Upper Class 
 %Tribal/Traditional area 
 % Primary School 
 % Secondary School  
 % Youth  
 % Over budgeted income 
 % Over budgeted expenditure 
 









Table 4: Bartlett’s Sphericity Test 
 2007 2011 
Chi-square 1368.969 1199.946 
Degrees of freedom 10 10 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 5: KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
 2007 2011 
KMO Statistic 0.805 0.77 
 

























































0.4371 0.4698 -0.6351 0.0025 0.4299 











0.4528 -0.4373 0.0212 0.7755 0.0443 
 











Component One  3.90665 0.7813 3.69604 0.7392 
Component Two 0.642862 0.1286 0.739921 0.1480 
Component Three 0.236446 0.0473 0.326153 0.0652 
Component Four 0.12633 0.0253 0.133351 0.0267 
Component Five  0.0877119 0.0175 0.104532 0.0209 
 
Service Delivery Principal Component Scores  
Table 8: Consistently Weak Municipalities
Municipal 
Code 2011 2007 
KZN271 -4.514643 -0.9086426 
EC444 -3.89666 -2.574112 
KZN244 -3.769976 -2.092293 
KZN272 -3.499238 -0.8716362 
KZN294 -3.181668 -2.132886 
KZN211 -2.967129 -1.931426 
KZN293 -2.93853 -1.903229 
DC27 -2.864517 -0.6387326 
KZN273 -2.578562 -0.6606766 
KZN286 -2.439109 -2.098297 
EC441 -2.421703 -1.104154 
EC442 -2.398729 -2.170867 
DC44 -2.332602 -1.604079 
EC141 -2.322904 -2.053031 
KZN253 -2.174111 -0.9345497 
DC24 -2.146401 -1.283733 
KZN213 -2.138337 -1.533922 
EC121 -2.094056 -2.260714 
KZN431 -2.079005 -2.5599 
EC137 -2.012192 -2.145422 




KZN242 -1.863664 -1.138641 
KZN434 -1.808211 -1.217279 
KZN274 -1.69983 -0.3330373 
KZN233 -1.51372 -0.8497332 
KZN284 -1.509741 -1.5198 
KZN245 -1.50432 -1.297114 
EC443 -1.389945 -2.05499 
EC122 -1.295052 -1.090122 
KZN283 -1.250018 -1.908616 
DC43 -1.226653 -1.708233 
KZN261 -1.200699 -0.8518611 
EC153 -1.19561 -2.314932 
KZN265 -1.140818 -2.15907 
EC135 -1.098425 -2.066398 
GT483 -1.097569 -2.054615 
KZN435 -1.083978 -2.243247 
KZN226 -1.03291 -1.961193 
EC154 -0.8557932 -2.529561 
KZN285 -0.7791973 -2.069184 
DC14 -0.7763277 -0.7372625 
KZN236 -0.7597228 -1.475968 
DC26 -0.7217838 -1.103116 
DC12 -0.7164054 -0.541168 
DC15 -0.6937757 -1.938865 
EC155 -0.6385947 -2.015201 
DC29 -0.6110601 -0.919505 
DC21 -0.5778591 -0.8398693 
KZN223 -0.5734695 -0.1305775 
KZN263 -0.5617373 -0.1600721 
EC156 -0.5272942 -2.093678 
KZN221 -0.5215073 -0.7089083 
KZN262 -0.5008816 -0.4589967 
KZN234 -0.4860702 -0.6429737 
EC157 -0.4778373 -1.167574 
MP312 -0.4711301 -0.3160199 
KZN266 -0.4708281 -1.620663 
NW397 -0.4480096 
 
DC23 -0.4001895 -0.7926658 
FS195 -0.369189 -0.0294396 
KZN235 -0.3386779 -1.566904 
KZN432 -0.3379303 -0.669434 
DC28 -0.3123473 -0.6191516 
NC092 -0.304651 -0.0390654 
DC13 -0.2771176 -0.7900742 
LIM341 -0.2657901 -0.0409692 
LIM361 -0.2394519 -0.8137509 
NW374 -0.1572223 -0.4963429 
MP323 -0.1540377 -0.1771453 
EC136 -0.1249234 -1.353036 
EC138 -0.0829692 -1.038969 
KZN215 -0.0275456 -1.417493 
EC123 -0.012423 -0.7637694 
KZN214 -0.0025588 -2.013216 
 
Table 9: Worsened Municipalities  
Municipal 
Code 2011 2007 
NC084 -1.112944 0.0986259 
NC066 -1.054866        1.398907 
KZN275 -1.043174 0.2770641 
MP303 -0.9258329 0.0179631 
NC074 -0.4629597 1.189161 
NW382 -0.4543595 0.796213 




NW384 -0.43224 0.1295832 
MP302 -0.3876063 0.525647 
NC076 -0.3528734 0.5835286 
LIM475 -0.3164361 0.3512736 
NW401 -0.2905706 0.0566975 
KZN212 -0.275965 0.0447842 
NW392 -0.2452971 0.4882671 
NC065 -0.2362512 1.184283 
KZN241 -0.0820871 0.3219208 
GT422 -0.069037 0.8479332 
WC051 -0.0666754 1.332096 
EC106 -0.0393084 0.632788 
   
  
Table 10: Improving Municipalities  
Municipal 
Code 2011 2007 
KZN254 0.023348 -0.12381 
NW372 0.044311 -0.52504 
EC142 0.054007 -0.20287 
KZN227 0.077906 -0.73652 
DC48 0.089893 -0.50379 
NC451 0.097485 -0.13717 
KZN232 0.121835 -0.04115 
EC124 0.14305 -0.98341 
KZN291 0.145744 -0.5244 
NW404 0.168461 -0.14745 
NW373 0.181402 -0.83316 
MP306 0.191173 -0.75973 
DC30 0.206529 -0.09859 
KZN224 0.219699 -2.60824 
KZN281 0.230471 -0.59931 
DC37 0.264187 -0.42529 
MP321 0.270854 -0.48614 
FS205 0.279815 -0.05988 
FS193 0.295011 -0.36669 
MP311 0.30849 -0.03376 
DC22 0.392965 -0.0854 
   
NC082 0.483323 -0.03391 
NC453 0.515003 -0.1388 
DC40 0.56481 -0.37461 
FS191 0.564876 -0.46291 
MP305 0.565987 -0.39157 
WC048 0.577559 -0.10728 
DC20 0.646239 -0.10693 
KZN292 0.674604 -0.09095 
NW403 0.678579 -0.02818 
MP307 0.680675 -0.42639 
FS185 0.683176 -0.58558 
DC18 0.724119 -0.17997 
WC044 0.728798 -0.00477 
FS184 0.734987 -0.02658 
EC126 0.75539 -0.56855 
NC086 0.772868 -0.08221 
FS181 0.881444 -0.82545 
FS201 0.88637 -0.76042 
WC047 0.935675 -0.2355 










NW393 0.029743 0.471095 
BUF 0.039893 ------------- 
NW385 0.109218 0.846673 
EKU 0.125407 0.129875 
NC078 0.126411 0.658749 
DC39 0.129602 0.641325 
NC094 0.131812 0.396286 
LIM354 0.180647 0.766502 
DC9 0.200621 0.700396 
LIM342 0.201555 0.080238 
MP324 0.203498 1.132297 
LIM365 0.203748 0.031762 
NC085 0.212805 0.217708 
MP314 0.223996 0.419527 
NW381 0.227563 0.856223 
DC25 0.235472 0.688558 
FS182 0.265559 0.159071 
GT482 0.284312 0.12696 
NW383 0.287012 0.584801 
FS192 0.304055 0.577404 
NC071 0.305548 0.974028 
NC091 0.309288 0.953763 
NC093 0.316163 0.543146 
LIM366 0.316202 0.280921 
LIM362 0.318388 0.33614 
DC7 0.323247 0.936119 
MP304 0.333774 0.378499 
WC045 0.335696 0.955794 
LIM364 0.342284 0.583412 
KZN222 0.350757 0.214987 
KZN216 0.361177 0.302084 
DC31 0.366156 0.244216 
GT481 0.37779 0.042704 
DC47 0.381676 0.588555 
NW396 0.394083 0.216475 
NC077 0.397614 0.968163 
LIM333 0.401686 0.859882 
EC105 0.405163 0.85245 
WC052 0.415152 1.202916 
FS204 0.416075 0.55922 
DC6 0.419522 0.810884 
DC8 0.427645 0.276174 
DC36 0.436182 0.49633 
NC072 0.436958 0.787138 
EC108 0.448957 0.84928 
EC102 0.450714 0.77455 
DC45 0.451947 0.117213 
EC109 0.459392 1.064413 
KZN252 0.465684 0.985778 
DC34 0.466568 0.6188 
DC19 0.46686 0.118106 
LIM343 0.46934 0.568917 
DC10 0.472577 0.927465 
DC35 0.482991 0.938937 
NC064 0.484481 0.405589 
MP301 0.487959 0.080997 
LIM351 0.520908 1.070234 
EC132 0.523433 0.210593 
NC075 0.528712 0.953334 
WC025 0.544796 0.826498 
EC127 0.552509 0.051662 




EC103 0.560248 1.331732 
NW394 0.560529 0.798101 
TSH 0.5609 0.114884 
DC33 0.572292 0.744515 
WC011 0.573343 1.249407 
WC012 0.580624 1.283445 
DC32 0.582102 0.855026 
 WC031 0.593235 0.963309 
FS194 0.594313 0.247069 
LIM331 0.59454 0.183288 
EC107 0.60204 1.448644 
DC5 0.61671 1.340577 
LIM344 0.618829 0.860464 
EC104 0.625897 0.928449 
LIM471 0.632588 1.048077 
NC067 0.633899 0.26731 
WC041 0.638041 1.301529 
FS163 0.642274 0.063127 
ETH 0.650528 0.180546 
GT423 0.654692 0.643084 
NW375 0.656009 0.154521 
MP322 0.673571 0.864232 
WC032 0.6854 0.79649 
LIM473 0.686557 0.583361 
NMA 0.692846 0.78638 
EC144 0.695444 1.284652 
NW402 0.695893 0.475588 
DC42 0.697898 0.69889 
LIM335 0.699686 0.937126 
LIM332 0.711714 0.856709 
JHB 0.715366 0.424394 
LIM334 0.71651 1.054202 
MP313 0.717826 0.28977 
EC134 0.724422 0.686924 
FS196 0.728215 0.539037 
DC4 0.732034 0.449859 
LIM472 0.73641 0.431727 
NC083 0.737792 0.530544 
NC452 0.7399 0.530839 
DC3 0.739906 0.920615 
MAN 0.755401 
 
LIM474 0.763804 1.067771 
EC133 0.775794 1.281808 
LIM367 0.784279 1.091501 
KZN225 0.789677 0.33813 
FS183 0.789734 0.163409 
LIM355 0.792412 1.169211 
FS203 0.797313 0.406991 
WC053 0.797996 1.358576 
GT421 0.808117 0.686297 
DC16 0.808168 0.546757 
EC128 0.809468 0.783495 
NW371 0.812227 0.385771 
MP315 0.817003 0.596469 
NC073 0.837216 1.281879 
FS162 0.838896 0.852325 
FS161 0.849424 0.565958 
DC2 0.850513 0.675691 
WC024 0.860151 1.036042 
WC022 0.889882 0.078631 
KZN282 0.89686 0.588522 
NC062 0.912529 0.879025 
FS164 0.918182 0.402735 
WC043 0.920383 0.799216 
MP325 0.927917 1.129496 
CPT 0.932095 0.688345 
WC034 0.932485 1.14675 
EC101 0.938985 1.3113 




WC026 0.945839 1.30898 
DC1 0.960801 1.161039 
LIM352 0.975806 1.154362 
WC042 0.994178 1.296579 
WC013 0.996072 1.125371 
WC023 1.00289 0.398688 
EC131 1.045276 1.434404 
LIM353 1.051685 0.830382 
NC061 1.067024 0.478316 
MP316 1.115114 0.87566 
WC033 1.115505 0.935209 
WC014 1.137313 1.095155 
WC015 1.191497 1.132064 
    
 
 
Table 12: Results from Kruskal-Wallis H test for characteristics that differ between municipal 






Sex ratio (%) 12.150 3 0.0069 
Audit outcomes in 2011 10.121 3 0.0176 
% Female Headed households 67.939 3 0.0001 
% Working age 65.849 3 0.0001 
% Youth 69.758 3 0.0001 
% Elderly 5.111 3 0.1638 
% No schooling 16.027 3 0.0011 
% Higher education 7.689 3 0.0529 
% Matric 8.495 3 0.0368 
% of population 2011 7.297 3 0.0630 
% of population 2007 13.114 3 0.0044 
Population Density (persons per 
km2) 
22.913 3 0.0001 
No of households 3.720 3 0.2933 
Growth rate (of people from 2001-
2011) 
30.034 3 0.0001 
                                                 
7 Where the probability statistic with or without ties differed, the figure for ‘with ties’ has been 
recorded.   




Table 14: Output from Fixed Effects F-Test Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test  
 
Table 15: Output from Hausman Test 
 
No of agricultural households 28.690 3 0.0001 
Average household size  (People) 56.960 3 0.0001 
% Formal dwelling 142.396 3 0.0001 
% Housing owned / Paying off 9.948 3 0.0190 
Mean annual household income 
(R) 
58.943 3 0.0001 
Dependency ratio (%) 65.926 3 0.0001 
Unemployment rate 38.578 3 0.0001 








Test: Var(u) = 0 Chibar2(01) = 2.04 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0768 
 
 
Test – Ho: Difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
Chi2 (29) = (b-B)’[(v_b – B_B)^(-1)(b-B) 
 = 85.50 








Table 13: Output from Fixed Effects F-Test  
 




2. Summary Statistics of OLS Regression Variables 
 Regression Assumption Testing  
The data used in tables 12 – 14 was drawn from the 2007 Statistics South Africa 
National Community Survey, the 2011 National Census database and is nationally 
representative. Thus, there is no need to include weights in the regression - all the 
municipalities in South Africa have been included in the data.  
 
Furthermore, it would not be correct to assume that the service delivery scores are 
independent from one municipality to the next, as it is likely that municipalities within 
certain geographic areas are similar to one another. The standard errors produced by 
the OLS regressions are thus clustered at the municipal level, to account for 
neighbouring municipalities having similar operating environments and similar 
performance track records.  
 
In addition, for both 2007 and 2011, homoscedasticity is ensured through the use of 
robust standard errors in the regression analysis. Although the 2011 errors do not 
appear to be normally distributed and there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the 
data, the non-normality does not bias the OLS estimates. In both 2007 and 2011, only 
variables that had a variance inflation factor of less than ten, as appears standard in 
the literature, were retained in the regressions to ensure moderate collinearity. The 
rejected variables are listed in table two of the appendix.   
 












273 0.0129544 0.9805277 -4.514309 1.191544 








































Disclaimer  86 31.5% 107 39.19% 
Adverse with 
Findings 
4 1.47% 12 4.40% 
Qualified with 
Findings 
67 24.57% 63 23.08% 
Unqualified with 
Findings 
107 39.19% 88 32.23% 
Unqualified with 
No Findings 
9 3.30% 3 1.10% 














Own Source Revenue to 
Operating Revenue 
261 60.988 24.933 1.822 100 
Staff Costs to Operating 
Expenditure 
260 33.592 9.168 0 67.038 
Creditors to Operating 
Expenditure 
 
260 12.898 18.405 -2.373 130.632 
Debtors to Service Charges  
 
226 126.903 599.7549 -766.44360 8288.239 
 
Infrastructure expenditure to 
Capital expenditure  
 
245 69.676 29.823 0 100 
Borrowing to Capital Revenue 
 
245 6.812 14.647 0 70.801 
Employee Costs to Own 
Revenue 
 
261 98.707 256.163 0 2820.306 
Borrowing to PPE 
 
219 69.568 545.068 0 5540.308 
2007 
Own Source Revenue to 
Operating Revenue 
271 48.383 27.664 0.256 95.923 
Staff Costs to Operating 
Expenditure 
271 48.383 27.664 0.256 95.923 




Borrowing to Capital Revenue 
 
270 6.318 16.914 0 100 
Employee Costs to Own 
Revenue 
 
271 195.092 1232.477 20.262 20231.48 
Infrastructure expenditure to 
Capital expenditure  
 
270 47.137 36.277 0 100 
Borrowing to PPE 
 
219 69.568 545.068 0 5540.308 
Debtors to Service Charges  
 
236 650.753 4888.918 0 72158.33 
Creditors to Operating 
Expenditure 












Percentage of Lower class 
income  
273 18.202 4.043 7.267 27.047 
Percentage of Middle class 
income 
273 51.949 9.189 30.154 67.296 
Percentage of Upper class 
income 
273 29.967 10.914 12.268 56.504 
2007 
Percentage of Lower class 
income  
272 8.490 3.857 0.461 26.010 












Percentage of Middle class 
income 
272 54.387 10.536 22.038 76.758 
Percentage of Upper class 
income 









Percentage of Unemployed   273 9.081 2.491 2.177 15.201 
Percentage of Employed 273 21.465 9.537 4.218 44.901 
Percentage of Not 
Economically Active 
273 65.267 8.957 45.457 83.366 
2007 
Percentage of Unemployed   273 18.410 5.621 4.45 35.6 
Percentage of Employed 273 35.731 12.971 8.18 66.82 
Percentage of Not 
Economically Active 








Household Goods Score 2011 273 0.033 0.968 -3.096 1.622 
Household Goods Score   273 0.032 0.981 -2.605 1.903 

















Political Dominance 2011    273 1.351 0.607 0 2 
Political Dominance 2007 273 1.483 0.607 0 2 
Political 
Dominance 





















Percentage Black 273 75.592% 30.135% 2.778% 99.71% 
Percentage Coloured 273 15.96% 26.743% 0.033% 90.361% 
Percentage Indian 273 0.912% 2.051% 0.065% 16.655% 
Percentage White 273 7.07% 6.683% 0.050% 41.632% 












Percentage Black 273 74.092% 32.127 0.63% 100% 
Percentage Coloured 273 17.506% 28.874 0 96.97% 
Percentage Indian 273 0.788% 2.147 0 18.68% 









Percentage of Population 
classified as Youth 
273 31.647% 5.173 21.134% 44.168% 
Percentage of Population 
classified as Working Age 
273 62.385% 5.323 50.630% 76.441% 
Percentage of Population 
classified as Elderly 
273 5.967% 1.591 2.181% 12.873% 
2007 
Percentage of Population 
classified as Youth 
273 32.876% 5.749 21.714% 47.761% 
Percentage of Population 
classified as Working Age 
273 61.115% 6.065 46.464% 76.117% 
Percentage of Population 
classified as Elderly 
273 6.004% 1.755 1.702% 13.194% 
















Percentage of Population with 
No Schooling 
273 8.015% 3.295 2.106% 19.317% 
Percentage of Population with 
Primary Schooling 
273 27.137% 4.866 14.977% 40.786% 
Percentage of Population with 
Secondary Schooling 
273 47.088% 5.960 31.489% 59.477% 
Percentage of Population with 
Tertiary Schooling 
273 3.76% 1.843 0.940% 12.633% 
Percentage of Population with 
Postgrad Education 
273 0.147% 0.085 0.014% 0.469% 
Percentage of Population with 
Other Education 
273 0.464% 0.386 0.063% 2.965% 
2007 
Percentage of Population with 
No Schooling 
273 9.344% 4.294 2.289% 29.352% 
Percentage of Population with 
Primary Schooling 
273 26.350% 7.691 7.341% 64.551% 
Percentage of Population with 
Secondary Schooling 
273 42.574% 9.716 11.727% 90.612% 
Percentage of Population with 
Tertiary Schooling 
273 2.177% 1.054 0.586% 6.169% 
Percentage of Population with 
Postgrad Education 
273 0.223% 0.314 0.002% 2.702% 




















Percentage of Population 
2011 
273 0.359% 0.644 0.008% 5.322% 
Percentage of Population 
2007 








Homeland Status  273 2.340 0.546 0 3 
Homeland Status Number Percentage 













Percentage Male  273 48.44% 2.189 43.442% 58.517% 
Percentage Female 273 51.606% 2.27 41.482% 61.816% 





3. Fixed Effect Regression Assumptions  
The data used for the fixed effects regression in table 13 and 14 was also tested to check 
whether time fixed effects were needed. However, the null hypothesis that all the year 
dummy variables are zero could not be rejected at a probability level of p < 0.10 and 
thus no time fixed effects need to be added to the regression.  
 
This thesis is also making the assumption that the unobserved effects influencing 
municipal service delivery are time-invariant. In the case of some effects, such as 
number and capacity of staff, this may not be entirely true, leaving the thesis’ findings 
vulnerable to biasedness. However, this will be more muted than the bias present in 
OLS regressions with missing data and thus the fixed effects regression will provide 
a better estimate of the relationship between municipal service delivery and audit 
outcomes.  
 
As usual, homoscedasticity is an important assumption when running fixed effects 
regressions, and a test of the data reveals that the null hypothesis of constant variance 
is rejected at a probability level of p < 0.000. Thus, the fixed effects regression will be 
run with robust standard errors.   
 
As the panel is a micro dataset only covering a timespan of a few years, cross-sectional 
dependence and serial correlation should not be major problems plaguing the data. It 
is, however, likely that the data will be correlated within a municipality across the 





Percentage Male  273 48.019% 2.512 42.75% 57.5% 
Percentage Female 273 51.980% 2.512 42.5% 57.25% 





4. Figures  
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Figure 1: Scree plot for 2011 Principal Component Analysis 
